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Glossary  
ACT Australian Capital Territory 
ADL Activities of daily living, an instrument to measure functional status 
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group 
CCT1, CCT2 Co-ordinated Care Trials [Australia ]; two sets of integrated care experiments 
undertaken in the 1990s and 2000s 
CHC Coordinated Health Care [Australia ]; one of the CCT2 trials 
CHCPs Community health and care partnerships [Scotland] 
CHPs Community Health Partnerships [Scotland] 
CMA Community Medical Alliance [US] 
CMHT Community Mental Health Team 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [US] 
CT+ Care Trust Plus 
DiD difference-in-difference 
DVA Department of Veterans’ Affairs [US] 
FFS Fee-for-service 
GP general practitioner 
H&SC Health and social care 
HA Health Authority 
HACC Home and Community Care [Australia ] 
HEDIS Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set [US ]; national process 
measures of care quality, used for performance assessment 
HMO Health Maintenance Organization [US] 
[HR]QoL [health-related] quality of life 
HSS Health and social services [Northern Ireland] 
ICES integrated community equipment services 
ICP Integrated Care Pilot 
IRM Integrated resource mechanism 
IT information technology 
MBS Medicare Benefits Schedule [Australia ] 
MH mental health 
MSHO Minnesota Senior Health Options 
NH Nursing home 
NICE National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
PACE Program of All-Inclusive Care for the elderly [US] 
PBS Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme [Australia ] 
POPPs Partnerships for Older People Projects 
PREM Patient-reported experience measure 
PROM Patient-reported outcome measure 
PRISMA Programme of Research to Integrate Services for the Maintenance of Autonomy 
[Canada] 
PRISMA Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (reporting 
guidelines) 
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Year 
RCT Randomised controlled trial 
RDNS Royal District Nursing Service [Australia ] 
Regression to 
the mean 
A phenomenon whereby a subset of extreme results is followed by results that 
are less extreme on average 
S/HMO Social Health Maintenance Organization [US] 
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Selection bias A systematic distortion of the data resulting from the fact that individuals 
included in the study are not representative of the population from which they 
were selected 
SF-36 Short-form (36 items), a quality of life instrument 
SIPA Système de services intégrés pour personnes âgées en perte d’autonomie 
(system of integrated care for older persons with disabilities) [Canada] 
TCHII Team Care Health II [Australia]; one of the CCT2 trials 
VHA Veterans Health Administration [US] 
VISN Veterans Integrated Service Networks [US] 
WPP Wisconsin Partnership Program [US] 
 
  




Integrated care is often perceived as a solution for some of the major challenges faced by health and 
social care systems.  In these systems, 20% of the population accounts for 80% of the expenditure on 
care [1].  These ‘high users’ are typically people with one or more long-term conditions and who 
have complex needs that straddle health and social care boundaries; the population includes, but is 
not limited to, older people.  By coordinating care at the level of the individual, decision makers 
should in theory identify problems earlier in the care pathway and shift care closer to home, 
improve the patient experience, prevent or reduce avoidable hospital admissions and delayed 
discharges, improve health outcomes and reduce unnecessary duplication of care.  However, 
empirical studies of integrated care systems suggest that the reality falls far short of these high 
expectations.  While some evaluations have identified cost savings or improved outcomes, most find 
no significant benefits, and in those that do identify improvements, the effects are small.   
 
One factor often cited as a reason for these disappointing findings is that financial barriers thwart 
the efforts of clinicians and social care workers to integrate care for their patients or clients.  
However, there has been little systematic attempt to investigate this perceived barrier and whether 
the attempts to address it have been effective or cost-effective.  This review focuses on the role of 
integrated financial mechanisms in supporting and incentivising integrated care.   
 
Aims 
To systematically review the international evidence on: 
 
 The types of integrated resource mechanisms (IRM) available 
 The costs and effects of these mechanisms, including unintended consequences 
 The barriers to implementation and the factors critical to success. 
 
Methods 
We searched eight electronic databases.  We also searched relevant websites, and checked 
reference lists of literature reviews and empirical studies. Records identified from the searches were 
screened for eligibility by two members of the research team using a pre-specified set of inclusion 
and exclusion criteria.  Any differences in eligibility decisions were resolved by discussion.  Data from 
the included studies were extracted into a template and findings were summarised narratively.   
 
Results 
The searches identified around 3,500 records.  After screening for eligibility, 92 schemes were 
identified.  Fifty-four schemes were excluded from the review.  Reasons for exclusion varied, but 
included an absence of financial integration (35%) or integration across health care only (57%).  We 
did not exclude schemes on the basis of study design, but did exclude schemes for which we found 
no relevant evidence of any type.  Thirty-eight schemes, reported in 122 articles, met the inclusion 
criteria.    
 
The included schemes were set in eight countries.  With the exception of one Canadian trial, all the 
randomised evidence came from Australia, with quasi-experimental studies used in Australia, 
Canada, England, Sweden and the US.  Evaluations in England and the US included analyses of 
routine data, but the predominant approach in England was the use of qualitative studies and other 
types of uncontrolled evaluations.   
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Most studies were not designed to investigate the ‘added effect’ of an IRM; thus, with few 
exceptions, we cannot disentangle effects of integrated financing from integrated care.  Therefore, 
the current evidence base principally addresses the question of whether an IRM plus integrated care 
is more beneficial and/or has lower costs or utilisation relative to ‘usual care’. 
 
Health outcomes 
Health outcomes were evaluated in 23 (60%) of the 38 schemes included in the review.  The 
evaluations assessed a variety of health outcomes, including measures of health-related quality of 
life [2-6], physical functioning [3, 5, 7-10], depression and anxiety [2, 6], morale [6], mortality [3, 10-
14], and carer burden [6, 9, 11].  Various measures of user and carer satisfaction were also reported 
[2, 6, 9, 15].  Most schemes (13/23) found no evidence of an impact on individuals’ health, and 
findings for the remaining schemes were mixed (n=5), better in the integrated scheme (n=4) or 
better in the control group (n=1).  Three of the 13 English schemes in our review reported 
improvements in health.  
 
Service use and costs 
Most (34/38) schemes assessed the impact of IRMs on secondary care costs or utilisation.  In 11 
schemes, the integrated scheme had no significant effect on hospital costs, although this did not 
preclude a change in the care pathway or a substitution of services across settings.  Three schemes 
reported reductions in secondary care use, but admissions were significantly higher in the 
integration group in one scheme.  However, for most schemes the evidence was mixed (n=14) or 
unclear (n=5).  There was some evidence that IRMs were associated with reductions in delayed 
discharges, either through cross charging or by integrated management and pooled funds.  It was 
less clear if these effects were causal, or whether reductions were sustained in the longer term.  
Evidence for reductions in unplanned admissions was equivocal, but there was tentative evidence 
for a mitigating effect in subgroups of individuals at high risk of hospital admission.  Evidence that 
IRMs supported a reduction in the risk of institutionalization was even more ambivalent. 
 
Other effects 
Unintended consequences of the schemes were not routinely reported, but several were 
highlighted.  Evaluations of Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) found evidence of 
‘cream skimming’, with schemes excluding those with psychiatric disorders or substance abuse 
problems [16].  Clients in the first wave of Social Health Maintenance Organization (S/HMO I) 
evaluations who were deemed to be ‘nursing home certifiable’ were, on closer inspection, found to 
be less frail and complex than expected – which may have been due to the higher fee paid for this 
client group (‘upcoding’).  In the evaluation of cross-charging in England, there was anecdotal 
evidence that the scheme led to poor outcomes for patients in terms of “overly hasty” discharge and 
increased risk of readmission [17]. 
 
Conclusions 
Compared with ‘usual care’, schemes that integrated funds and resources to support integrated care 
seldom led to improved health outcomes.  Although some schemes succeeded in shifting care closer 
to home, and some achieved short term reductions in acute care utilisation, no scheme 
demonstrated a sustained and long term reduction in hospital use.   
 
Moreover, if schemes improve co-ordination and focus greater attention on patient needs, there is a 
good chance that co-ordinated care “reveals rather than resolves” unmet need [84, 85].  Overall, 
although this may be a beneficial outcome for society, it may increase, rather than reduce, total 
costs. Therefore, decision makers would need to recognise that there may be trade-offs between 
different objectives, both in the short and longer term.  
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In England, new schemes were often introduced in the context of a raft of existing and evolving 
policy initiatives, which makes the evaluation of their effects methodologically challenging.  For this 
reason, new schemes need to be rolled out cautiously and their evaluation should strive to 
incorporate appropriate controls.  Evaluations should seek to consistently measure a range of effects 
and costs, including the routine assessment of unintended consequences and barriers to 
implementation, as well as patient-reported measures of outcomes (PROMs) and experience 
(PREMs).   
 
Key words 
Payment systems, pooled budgets, joint commissioning, integrated care, systematic review




In England, the sharp demarcation of health care and social care systems has been described as a 
“Berlin Wall” [18].  The care system has evolved on the assumption that people who are ‘sick’, and 
people who are ‘frail’ or ‘disabled’ can be easily distinguished [19].  This system may be appropriate 
and adequate for individuals with uncomplicated needs – needs that can be easily categorized either 
as wholly medical, or as wholly functional and social.  But the reality is that an increasing proportion 
of the population has complex needs.  This includes the older population with chronic diseases and 
multiple morbidities [20, 21], children born with complex conditions who are now living to 
adulthood, and people with learning disabilities whose care needs may be lifelong [22].  For these 
people, care delivery systems that are predominantly designed for acute illness [23] may be both 
inappropriate and inadequate.  In the words of Glasby and colleagues (2011): “put simply, people do 
not live their lives according to the categories we create in our welfare services” [19].   
 
Policy response 
The common sense response to this ‘Berlin wall’ is to dismantle it by integrating care across health 
and social care boundaries.  In the 2013 framework document “Integrated Care: Our Shared 
Commitment”, twelve national partners set out the case for change: 
 
“We need major change and we are determined to act. That means building a system of 
integrated care for every person in England. It means care and support built around the needs of 
the individual, their carers and family and that gets the most out of every penny we spend. If the 
illness is prevented, the condition properly managed, the fall avoided, not only is that better care 
for the individual but it also means less pressure on the system … Integrated care and support 
isn’t the end. It is the means to the end of achieving high quality, compassionate care resulting in 
better health and wellbeing and a better experience for patients and service users, their carers 
and families” [22]. 
 
This type of integrated care for individuals cannot be achieved without regulatory and legislative 
support.  In England, the Health and Social Care Act (2012) contains several provisions to encourage 
more effective coordinated working where this is beneficial for patients [24].  The Act places a duty 
on Monitor (the healthcare regulator with responsibility for price setting) to ‘enable’ integrated care, 
and a duty on NHS England (the organization responsible for improving outcomes) to secure the 
provision of health services integrated with social services.  Health and Wellbeing Boards, charged 
with improving the health of the local population and reducing inequalities, must encourage 
providers of health and social care to work in an integrated manner.  They are also responsible for 
promoting local use of the ‘flexibilities’, the statutory options for joint financing or sharing of 
resources which are set out in the National Health Service Act 2006 (s.75) [25].  This is important 
because funding methods for health and social care are different: health care is largely funded by tax 
with patients mostly shielded from the financial consequences of their care; whereas social care is 
characterised by means-testing, co-payments and devolvement of budgets to individual service 
users [21].  Commissioners, who are responsible for planning and purchasing care, therefore hold 
separate budgets for health and social care.  The flexibilities in the NHS Act enable NHS bodies and 
local authorities to delegate functions to one another and create joint funding arrangements [26]. 
The overall aims of these reforms are to improve quality, and to reduce inefficiency and inequalities. 
Greater integration is supported by additional government investment in joint funding between the 
NHS and social care [27], and by new quality standards from the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) [28].  
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Why focus on integrated resource mechanisms?  
There is an extensive national and international literature covering the definition, organisation, 
experience and impact of integrated care in a wide variety of contexts. The evidence base on 
integrated care consistently identifies financial factors as a major barrier to successful delivery [7, 
29-35].  However, the specific role played by mechanisms to integrate resources is rarely evaluated 
[36].  In principle, mechanisms that achieve financial integration across health and social care 
boundaries should align provider objectives, support coordinated care, reduce incentives to cost-
shift, and encourage efficiency [37, 38].  In short, these ‘integrated resource mechanisms’ (IRMs) 
should support ‘effective commissioning’: 
 
“Effective commissioning is a precondition to the successful delivery of the requirement for the 
NHS to achieve an efficiency gain of 4% per annum over the four years from 2011-12 (“the 
Nicholson Challenge”) [39]. 
 
In their June 2013 Spending Review, the government announced that £3.8 billion will be put into a 
pooled budget for health and social care services to work more closely together in local areas, a 
large increase from the £1bn originally planned in the 2010 Spending Review. The rationale is to 
deliver “better, more joined-up services to older and disabled people, to keep them out of hospital 
and to avoid long hospital stays” [40](p 22), and to support and reward integrated working in 
2015/16. To “accelerate this transformation”, the NHS will make £200 million available to local 
authorities in 2014/15 for investment in new systems and ways of working. The pooled budget, or 
‘Integration Transformation Fund’ [41](and then renamed as the ‘Better Care Fund’), includes IT 
funds to facilitate secure data sharing across NHS and local authorities, and further funds for carers 
and for the ‘reablement’ of people discharged from hospital (ibid, p 35). About £1 billion of the 
pooled budget will depend on performance against outcome targets [42].  However, there have 
already been calls for “flexibility” so that some of the fund can to be used to protect adult social care 
services that are jeopardised by cuts in overall funding [41] bringing with it the possibility that these 
funds will not be used for integrating health and social care services.   
 
A review of the evidence on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of such mechanisms therefore 
provides a timely addition to inform the development and implementation of policy in England.   
 
What do we expect to find? An economics perspective 
For integrated resource mechanisms, such as pooled budgets, to support effective integrated care, it 
is not sufficient that they merely exist.  Competent commissioning or purchasing is necessary to 
ensure the supply of health and social care services is sufficient to meet demand; and the health and 
social care staff who provide care ‘at the coal face’ need the requisite authority, information and skill 
to integrate resources: that is, to provide, or co-ordinate the provision, of tailored, joined-up care 
services. Using a simple conceptual framework in which there are two types of provider, two types 
of care and in which people with complex needs are cared for by an integrated care team, we 
consider how IRMs can support and incentivise integrated care.   
 
Conceptual framework 
The problem is described in two stages: first, we set out the theoretical effects of integrated care on 
an individual’s health status; second, we consider how IRMs could influence this process.  
 
Theoretical effects of integrated care 
Imagine a world where there are people with complex needs. For simplicity, we assume these 
individuals require packages of care that comprise two types of service: health care (H) and social 
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care (S).  The two types of service are supplied by two providers who hold separate budgets.  At any 
one point in time (t), individuals can be in one of 5 health1 states where the person’s health 
condition in state 1 is of mild severity (in social care terminology, they have ‘low need’ [43]) and 
their health in state 5 is very severe (‘critical need’).  In each health state, people need a basic 
minimum level of health and social care to be kept alive: Hbt and Sbt.  We assume that individuals 
move (transition) between health states over time.  Thus, in time period t an individual may be in 
health state 2, but in period t+1 he may stay in the same state, or transition to a better or worse 
health state.  We also assume that the transition probability (i.e. the likelihood of moving between 
states) for each pathway depends on how much additional care (‘discretionary’, over and above the 
basic level) the person receives in time, denoted as Hdt and Sdt.  We further assume that the quality 
of care is fixed, that health state 4 is associated with admission to long-term care and state 5 with 
admission to hospital (Figure 1).  
 
The principal-agent relationship is “a pervasive fact of economic life” [44] and the markets for health 
and social care are no exception.  In our model, each individual with complex needs (principal) has 
an integrated care team (agent) who assesses the individual’s needs and plans a package of care on 
his behalf.   The team co-ordinates provision of his health and social care and may also purchase this 
care.  In this instance, the providers are therefore acting as agents for the team - the team is their 
principal.  
 
Figure 1 sets out the case for one individual.  He begins in time 0 with a basic minimum package of 
care (care package 0, made up of Hb0 and Sb0); he receives no discretionary care, so Hd0 and Sd0 are 
both set at zero. This meets his essential needs (keeps him alive), but no more. Unless he receives 
some additional discretionary care in time 1, his health status will worsen and he will be hospitalised 
in time 2 – this is shown in the diagram by the move from health state 2 in time 1 to health state 5 in 
time 2 (i.e. he receives care package 0 in both time 0 and time 1). Once in hospital, he will receive 




Figure 1: Model of care pathways for an individual with complex needs 
Note: health status ranges from 1 (best) to 5 (worst); the care packages range in resource intensity from 0 (lowest) to 4 
(highest) 
                                                          
1
 We use ‘health’ as shorthand to refer to wellbeing in a broad sense, encompassing physical and mental or emotional 
health as well as functional status. 
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Suppose there are several alternative care packages available to the individual at time 1, each 
containing different combinations of discretionary health (Hd1) and social (Sd1) care.  With care 
package 3, the most highly resourced community package in time 1, the individual’s health will 
improve, moving to state 1 in time 2.  Care package 2 maintains his health at level 2, and package 1 
is enough to avert hospital admission but does not prevent the need for long term institutional care.  
Table 1 summarises these potential effects of integrated care with reference to Figure 1.  
 
This simple model also helps illustrate why it may be difficult to prevent admissions if budgets are 
constrained.  If current health and social care budgets are fully devoted to treating patients in acute 
settings and supporting discharge packages such as care package 4, there is little scope to divert 
resources into care packages 2 and 3 to support those whose health has not yet deteriorated.  
Therefore, we would expect that higher levels of initial funding are needed to move the system away 
from ‘crisis management’ and towards prevention. 
 
Table 1: The potential impacts of integrated care 
Potential Impact  Comment  
Improve access to 
care 
The integrated care team knows which additional services the user needs – the levels 
of Hd1 and Sd1 – to maintain or improve his health status. They also know how to 




If additional discretionary care is given early enough in the disease pathway, the 
individual’s health status is maintained above level 4 and hospitalization is avoided. 
Although the model does not show this, elective hospital care could also help reduce 
the risk of avoidable unplanned admissions. 
Increase community 
care (health and 
social care) 
To avoid admission to hospital, the individual needs more care than he is currently 
receiving from care package 0. Thus, preventative community health and social care 
may be required.  
Reduce total costs  Higher costs at time 1, caused by the utilization of Hd1 and Sd1, may lead to lower 
total costs in time 2 if subsequent hospital and residential care use is reduced or 
averted. 
Improve outcomes Better resourced packages of care such as packages 1 and 2 can maintain or even 
improve health status.  
Improve the quality of 
care 
The quality of care services is static in this simple model. However, earlier 
intervention could be conceived as better quality care per se.   
Reduce length of stay The team can ensure that appropriate levels of discretionary social care (Sd3) services 
are available to support timely discharge. 
Reduce residential 
care 
Higher use of community services (Hd1 and Sd1) may delay or avert the individual’s 
need for long term residential care.  
Improve patient and 
user experience of 
care 
Intervention to reduce morbidity may improve the individual’s experience of care. 
However, this depends how patients/users are involved in care decisions, and 
delivery process. Aggressive interventions to avert hospitalisation for individuals who 
are frail and vulnerable may be inappropriate.  
 
The influence of IRMs 
The model hints at the interdependence of the different parts of the system and why only one part 
needs to malfunction for integrated care to ‘fail’.   
 
The team’s ability to put together a package of care that includes discretionary services depends on 
several factors. The team needs the right mix and number of staff, and expertise to assess need and 
identify effective or cost-effective packages of care.  The team needs access to services, and this is 
determined by decisions taken by purchasers or commissioners, and is also influenced by competing 
demands for the services from the local population and by local and national policies on eligibility.  
Provider autonomy can also be a barrier to access: for instance, if the team identifies that an 
individual needs a package of community health and social care services to reduce the risk of falling, 
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they cannot arrange provision if providers restrict access to those whose health status is severe.  In 
England, access to social care services is mainly restricted to those whose needs are ‘critical’ or 
‘substantial’ and user charges often apply [43, 45].   As health and social care are typically provided 
by different organisations, the team may be unable to deliver the care package if one part is 
unavailable (e.g. the discretionary social care, Sd1).  If the two services are complements rather than 
substitutes, then the individual’s health will deteriorate.  
 
If separate budgets are held by separate health and social care commissioners, capacity to spread 
risk across the pool of individuals for whom each is financially responsible, i.e. the local populations, 
is relatively large.  However, health services and social care services may be substitutes or 
complements (depending on setting and user group) and the separation of budgets, even where 
there are joint agreements or joint working, may distort the allocation of resources. Those 
responsible for the separate budgets have an incentive to shift costs to the other services to protect 
their own resource.  As commissioners do not share the risks of higher initial costs nor share future 
potential ‘cost savings’ across the sectors, this can inhibit decisions to substitute cheaper care where 
appropriate.  The team may therefore identify an individual’s needs, but be unable to access care. 
An obvious solution is to align or pool the budgets to mitigate these effects, but who should then 
hold or control the budget? There are several options. 
 
The integrated care team holds a budget and can purchase a more highly resourced package of care 
(e.g. package 1) and so spend less on other individuals in time 1. The team’s decision to buy this 
package depends on the size of the risk pool, the size of the budget, service prices, the potential to 
reduce unnecessary duplication of services, and the potential for economies of scale or scope.  If 
preventative action reduces future total costs, cost savings can be returned to the team budget.  The 
scope of the budget also impacts the team’s decision: for example, if the budget excludes acute 
care, the costs of inpatient care will be incurred by a different budget holder (e.g. the local 
healthcare commissioning body).  Thus, the incentive to cost-shift remains, and what changes is the 
setting to which costs will be shifted.  However, if the budget is intended to cover all acute care, 
teams may be unwilling to take financial responsibility because demand for inpatient services is only 
partly under the influence of the team and the risks of overspending may be too high.   
 
The budget is held jointly (or pooled) by health and social care commissioners.  The risk pool for the 
joint budget will be similar to that of the team (or teams, if several teams operate within a local 
area), but the incentives for commissioners to cost-shift are reduced if the budget also covers acute 
and long-term care.  As commissioning is undertaken jointly, this enables better co-ordination of 
service provision and commissioners can formally agree to purchase more discretionary preventative 
health (Hdt) and social (Sdt) care (e.g. care packages 1 and 2 in Figure 1).  They need to negotiate 
suitable contracts with providers to ensure the team has access to services that go into these care 
packages: if providers retain their autonomy over eligibility decisions, the team may remain unable 
to arrange the care needed to avert admissions, despite having pooled resources. However, 
commissioners have imperfect information about the costs and benefits of services.  This 
uncertainty partly reflects the lack of robust evidence for many interventions, but also an asymmetry 
of information between commissioners and providers (the ‘hidden information’ problem [44]).  In 
particular, providers are likely to have better information about the marginal costs of provision.  This 
makes it more likely that commissioners face information asymmetries and are price-takers rather 
than price-setters and this can lead to inefficiencies.   As uncertainty affects the performance of the 
provider’s task (costs, process of care, outcomes of care), commissioners may choose to condition 
payment upon resolution of that uncertainty [44].  One option is to require outcome measurement 
as part of the contract; for instance, commissioners may choose to use incentive compatible 
contracts to disincentivise quality skimping [46]. 
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The budget is held jointly (or pooled) by a health and social care body with purchaser and provider 
functions.  For the team to assemble an appropriate package of care, it relies on commissioners’ 
ability to plan and purchase appropriate levels of both types of care for the population, and to 
negotiate appropriate contracts with providers.  If the commissioning and provider functions are 
held within the same body, this helps to overcome some of the informational deficits noted above.  
However, it is unlikely that a single organisation will be wholly responsible for all aspects of care for 
this client group.  In particular, specialised services, acute care and long-term nursing care may be 
provided elsewhere.  This means that the incentives to cost-shift are (again) not removed but 
refocused onto other parts of the system, and that the need for careful contracting remains.   
 
In reality, this simple conceptual framework is complicated by a number of factors. Some, such as 
the existence of eligibility criteria and user charges for social care, and of provider autonomy for 
health care, have already been discussed.  The framework assumes that services are homogenous, 
but in reality there would be different types of care, with different quality attributes: care such as 
informal care, provided by friends and family (typically provided free of charge), and care provided 
by the voluntary (or private) sector (which is usually subject to charges).  The existence of these 
additional components for the care package adds complexity to the team’s decisions – these types 
of care may be substitutes for social or health care, and may help to overcome barriers to access for 
some.  However as only some individuals can afford private care, its use may exacerbate health 
inequalities.  If the quality of care is also taken into account, then the informational requirements for 
an efficient purchasing decision are further increased. 
 
We have set out the principles of the way in which IRMs may support integrated care, which in turn 
can enhance health status.  We now consider the evidence from the literature about the nature of 
IRMs and their impact.   
 
Aims 
To systematically review the international evidence on: 
 
 The types of integrated resource mechanisms available 
 The costs and effects of these mechanisms, including unintended consequences 





The review builds on previous work undertaken to inform the Scottish Government’s Integrated 
Resource Framework [47]. This updated review has been extended and modified as follows: 
 
1. The overall aim is to interpret the evidence in the context of the restructured NHS, including 
the new commissioning arrangements. 
2. The review has been updated to include evidence from the international literature published 
since October 2009.   
3. The focus is on financial integration across health and social care (previously, financial 
integration across different healthcare settings was included). 
Overall policy questions 
- What mechanisms are available for integrating resource use across health and social care? 
- What evidence is there that these are effective or cost-effective, and what are the barriers to 
their use? 
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4. The scope of the work has been widened to include evidence from Scotland (previously 
excluded) 
5. Descriptive accounts that do not provide any type of evidence are excluded.  
 
We searched eight bibliographic databases.2  To ensure results were relevant for current health and 
social care systems in England, we restricted the searches to articles published in English in or after 
1999, and excluded articles on systems in developing countries.  The Medline strategy is in Appendix 
1, and full details of the searches are available on request from the authors.  In addition, we checked 
bibliographies of articles meeting the inclusion criteria, and searched relevant web sites (e.g. the 
King’s Fund).  In complex interventions where the use of integrated financial mechanisms was 
unclear, we contacted authors to seek clarification.  Each record was screened independently by two 
reviewers, and assessed for eligibility, and disagreements resolved by discussion.  A full set of 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for the review is provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the review 
 
Results 
Findings from the searches 
The searches identified around 3,500 records (Figure 2). After screening and checking individual 
records for eligibility, 122 full text articles were included in the review; many were excluded because 
they were commentaries or discussion pieces rather than evaluations.  There was rarely a simple 
one-to-one correspondence between the published articles and the schemes. Some articles reported 
information about multiple schemes; and in general, each scheme was referenced by more than one 
paper – we only included papers if they added new information on the scheme.  The schemes 
themselves were also complex: for instance, the English ‘Partnerships for Older People Projects’ 
                                                          
2
 Medline, ASSIA, HMIC, EconLit, Social Services Abstracts, Conference proceedings Citation index, Zetoc, Index to Theses 
INCLUSION CRITERIA 
1. Case studies / reviews of schemes that integrate financial or resource flows across health and 
social care 
a. with or without evaluations / evidence / theoretical analysis 
b. services for adults 
2. Mechanisms for allowing resources to follow patients between health and social care 
organisations 
3. Published in or after 1999 
4. English language 
 
EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
1. Reports of systems from developing countries  
2. Clinician/dentists/patient payment reimbursement mechanisms 
3. Personalised budgets 
4. Integrated systems for children’s services 
5. Financial integration across different healthcare settings only (not including social care) 
6. Financial integration across different social care settings only (not including health care) 
7. Articles with insufficient detail to judge inclusion criteria 
8. Commentary, opinion pieces and descriptive articles that provided no relevant empirical evidence 
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(POPP) programme encompassed 146 interventions based in 29 local authorities.  Only a small 
fraction of these projects also integrated funding streams, but we could not identify the results for 
these projects separately.  Therefore, our review reports only aggregated findings for the POPP 
programme and for similar complex programmes.  
 
The 122 published articles included in the review covered 38 individual schemes, set in 8 countries.  
The data extracted from these 38 schemes are tabulated in Appendix 2, together with ‘overviews’ of 
the two sets of Australian Coordinated Care Trials.  We excluded 54 schemes because they did not 
meet one or more of the inclusion criteria – for instance, there was no financial integration (35%), or 
the IRM covered health care only (57%) (for details, see Appendix 3).   
 
 
Figure 2: PRISMA diagram showing results of the literature searches 
Notes: the 122 included articles covered 38 individual schemes (Appendix 2). A list of the excluded schemes and the 
reasons for exclusion are provided in Appendix 3.   
PRISMA: Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
 
Study designs underpinning the evidence base 
The evaluative evidence employed a range of different study designs (Figure 3).  Almost 45% of the 
evaluations included qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews or focus groups.  About 
26% of the evaluations used mixed methods to purposively investigate different aspects of the 
schemes, typically combining a data analysis (e.g. either drawing on routine administrative data, or 
Records identified through 
database searching
( n = 3281)











Additional records identified 
through other sources
(n = 205)
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on data collected as part of a prospective study) with qualitative methods.  For other schemes, we 
identified separate evaluations that used different methods – these are not classified as ‘mixed 
methods’ because the evaluations were conducted independently.  One in four schemes was 
evaluated using data from uncontrolled studies, and 26% drew on analyses of administrative data.  
Some of these ‘uncontrolled’ studies used a before and after design and so simply compared 
outcomes (e.g. admission rates) after the introduction of the intervention against a pre-intervention 
baseline.   It is very difficult to draw any firm conclusions from these types of study, because they 
typically do not take account of other factors that may influence the observed changes and this 
makes attribution problematic.  Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) were used to investigate 16% of 
the schemes, and a further 32% employed quasi-experimental designs.  The latter are a type of 
interventional study that uses a matched control group; in the case of IRM studies, these control 
groups are typically drawn from another geographical area (or areas).  Also known as ‘non-
equivalent group’ studies, this design seeks to adjust for known confounding factors, but, unlike a 
randomized trial, it cannot eliminate unknown (unobserved) biases.  For all types of study design, 
findings may not be readily transferable to other settings because, unlike pharmaceutical 
interventions, the effects of the care delivery and financial or resource models are likely to be 
context dependent.   
 
 
Figure 3: Study designs applied to evaluate the integrated schemes 
 
Table 3 shows that the methodology used to investigate IRMs varied markedly by country.  With the 
exception of one Canadian trial, all the randomised evidence came from Australia, with quasi-
experimental studies used in Australia, Canada, England, Sweden and the US.  England and the US 
had studies that undertook analyses of routine data, but the predominant approach in England was 
the use of qualitative and/or uncontrolled evaluations.  This pattern was also evident in the other UK 
countries.  In contrast, Australia, Canada and the US invested large sums of money in prospective 
controlled trials to rigorously investigate the effects of integration on health and costs.  Moreover, 
Australia and the US invested in a second round of evaluations after disappointing findings from the 
first round prompted careful refinements to the care and funding models.  This underscores the 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Randomised controlled trials
Mixed methods 
(within a single study)





Percentage of schemes (N=38)
10  CHE Research Paper 97 
 
importance of looking beyond the national evidence base when seeking to inform English policy, 
although transferability of the results from outside the UK is obviously less straightforward.   
 
Table 3: Study design used in different countries 








Australia 0 0 3 0 0 5 
Canada 0 0 1 0 0 1 
England 10 8 3 4 8 0 
N. Ireland 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Scotland 2 2 0 0 1 0 
Sweden 2 1 1 0 1 0 
USA 1 2 4 6 0 0 
Wales 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Description of IRM categories 
Different ‘mechanisms’ can be used to integrate resources across health and social care. Table 4 
summarises the types of IRM that are available to NHS and social care commissioners in England.   
 
Table 4: Types of integrated resource mechanism available in England 
Type of IRM and level 
of integration 
Definition Statutory provision, 
England 
1: Transfer Payments Also known as Grant Transfer.  Transfer payments respectively 
allow local authorities to make service revenue or capital 
contributions to health bodies to support specific additional 
health services, and vice versa.  
NHS Act 2006 (s 76; s 
256) 
2: Cross charging Mandatory daily penalties.  Compensate for delayed 
discharges in acute care where social services are solely 
responsible and unable to provide continuation service. 
Community Care 
(Delayed Discharges 
etc) Act 2003 
3: Aligned budgets Partners align resources, identifying own contributions but 
targeted to the same objectives.  Joint monitoring of spend 
and performance.  Management and accountability for health 
and social services funding streams remain separate. 
Not applicable 
4: Lead commissioning One partner leads commissioning of services based on jointly 
agreed set of aims 
NHS Act 2006 (s 75) 
5: Pooled funds Each partner makes contributions to a common fund for 
spending on agreed projects or services  
NHS Act 2006 (s 75) 
6: Integrated 
management /provision 
without pooled funds 
θ
 
One partner delegates duties to another to jointly manage 
service provision 
NHS Act 2006 (s 75) 
7: Integrated 
management /provision 
with pooled funds 
Partners pool resources, staff, and management structures.  
One partner acts as host to undertake the other’s functions. 
Includes (but is not synonymous with) ‘joint commissioning’ 
across health and social care. 
NHS Act 2006 (s 75) 
8: Structural integration Health and social care responsibilities combined within a 
health body under single management. Finances and 





NHS Act 2006 (s 75) 
θ
 we excluded this category from the review because resources are not integrated. 
Adapted from: Audit Commission 2009 [37]; Carson 2010 [48]; Department of Health, 2013 [22]; Dickinson 2013 [49].
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Most of the schemes (31/38) in our review used pooled funds.  Around 70% of these schemes also 
had integrated management and/or provision and a further 6% put in place ‘lead commissioning’ 
arrangements to manage the pooled funds (‘joint commissioning’ arrangements are subsumed 
within the ‘integrated management’ category [49]).  Aligned budgets (which do not invoke the need 
for statutory measures) were used by three (8%) schemes, and two of these adopted a lead 
commissioning model.  Three in ten of the schemes took the form of structural integration, about 
one-third of which pooled funding streams; one scheme used aligned budgets.  Our review identified 
only one example of cross charging and we did not identify any evaluations of transfer payments.   
 
However, the typology listed in Table 4 is broad: in practice, the integrated resource mechanisms 
were highly heterogeneous.  IRMs were often adapted and tailored to the local situation and some 
schemes used different types of IRM in combination.  The approach to integrating care that the IRM 
supported also varied across schemes, as did the target clientele.  A further complicating factor is 
that most studies were not designed to investigate the ‘added effect’ of an IRM; with very few 
exceptions, we could not disentangle effects of integrated financing from integrated care.  
Therefore, the evidence principally addresses the question of whether an IRM plus integrated care is 
more beneficial and/or has lower costs or utilisation relative to ‘usual care’. The way that we present 
the evidence is therefore as follows: we briefly summarise the evidence, explore the findings from 
England and then discuss international evidence where this illuminates complex issues.  
 
Evidence on integrated resource mechanisms 
Outcomes 
The evaluations assessed a variety of outcomes, including measures of health-related quality of life 
[2-6], physical functioning [3, 5, 7-10], depression and anxiety [2, 6], morale [6], mortality [3, 10-14], 
and carer burden [6, 9, 11].  Satisfaction measures were also assessed [2, 6, 9, 15] and are 
considered below.  Health outcomes were assessed in 60% the schemes (23/38) and in 13 schemes 
there was no evidence of a significant benefit in favour of the integrated approach.  In the remaining 
schemes, findings were mixed (5 schemes), found health outcomes were better in the integrated 
scheme (n=4) or worse in the integrated scheme (n=1).  All the randomised trials in our review 
included an assessment of health outcomes, as did six of the 13 English schemes. The most reliable 
type of evidence available for the English studies was quasi-experimental.   
 
Two of the English schemes in our review reported improved health benefits.  Undertaken in the 
mid-1980s, the Darlington Pilot was one of the earliest attempts to employ integrated funds to 
support older, ‘mentally alert’ (cognitively unimpaired) individuals with significant care needs to stay 
at home.  Service managers held a ‘virtual’ devolved capitation budget equivalent to 67% of the cost 
of institutional care.  The quasi-experimental pilot found significantly greater improvements in 
morale and depression in the intervention group when compared with long-stay inpatients in 
another district [6].  The POPP national evaluation used a variety of methods for measuring health 
related quality of life. Findings were mixed:  there were slight improvements for those in the 
intervention groups, although there was variation by type of programme, with schemes aimed at the 
higher risk (of hospital admissions) groups showing the most improvement [4].  In all three schemes, 
the attribution of benefits to the integrated use of resources is uncertain – reasons for this relate to 
the study design and are explored in Appendix 4.  Turning to evidence from outside the UK, two 
schemes were associated with significant improvements in health outcomes, both of which used 
integrated management with pooled funds: one of the Australian co-ordinated care trials; and the 
San Franciscan scheme known as ‘On Lok’. These are described below. 
 
In a joint venture between commonwealth, state and territory Australian governments, two rounds 
of co-ordinated care trials were held in the late 1990s (13 trials) and the mid-2000s (5 trials). Our 
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review focused on the ‘mainstream’ (as opposed to ‘indigenous’3) trials that had pooled funds across 
health and social care; therefore, six ‘round 1’ (CCT1) trials and two ‘round 2’ (CCT2) trials were 
included in the review.  The trials were intended to be cost neutral [50] and to deliver improved 
health and wellbeing [2].  All employed integrated management (using one of three different 
primary care models) with pooled funding, and health benefits were assessed by the SF-36, a quality 
of life tool that incorporates summary measures of physical and mental health.  In six trials, the 
intervention did not consistently deliver better health benefits than usual care but intervention 
participants in one of the CCT2 trials, a randomized trial, reported better general health, less 
depression and better health-related quality of life [2].  In the remaining trial, a quasi-experimental 
study with geographical controls, there was a significantly greater deterioration in physical 
functioning in the intervention group [8].  
 
‘On Lok’ was developed in response to a shortage of skilled nursing beds for the local community in 
Chinatown, San Francisco [16]. Using adult day care as the base for provision of health and social 
care services, On Lok utilised case management by a multi-disciplinary team. Funded by capitated 
Medicare and Medicaid payments, the team took financial responsibility for all acute and long term 
care, including primary care.  A two-year quasi-experimental study found significant benefits in 
physical functioning for On Lok clients [7], and the scheme became a prototype for the more-
widespread Program of All-Inclusive Care for the elderly (PACE).  However, the health benefits 
achieved by PACE were ambiguous [3] and uptake of the programme was poor: in 2008, PACE 
enrolment equated to less than a quarter of one percent of the 9 million eligible individuals [33].   
 
Service use and costs 
In four of the 38 schemes we reviewed, there was no evidence on the impact of integration on 
secondary care costs or utilisation.  Of the remaining 34 schemes for which there was evidence on 
costs and/or utilisation, 11 schemes had no significant effect on hospital costs, although this did not 
preclude a change in the care pathway or a substitution of services across settings.  For example, 
both the second phase (CCT2) Australian RCTs reported a non-significant trend towards lower 
hospital costs in the intervention (co-ordinated care) group which was due to lower rates of hospital 
admission.  The triallists concluded that the intervention was likely to be cost-neutral in the longer 
term, absorbing the care co-ordination costs [2], although this was not demonstrated within the 3 
year time-frame of the study. 
 
Three schemes found a significant reduction in utilisation or costs, and one scheme found a 
significantly higher rate of admissions in the intervention group [8].  Evaluations of Torbay Care Trust 
have consistently reported reduced secondary care utilisation, although none of the evaluations was 
methodologically rigorous.  For instance, when Torbay was evaluated as part of the ICP pilot 
schemes, its performance was assessed relative to another geographical area.  It is therefore not 
possible to be sure that all confounding factors have been accounted for and that the comparison is 
like-for-like [51].   In Wye Valley, annual cost savings of £440,000 (due to 1,100 bed days saved) were 
reported for the year 2010/11 but there was no detail available about the basis for these estimates 
[52] and whether funds were subsequently transferred away from the hospital setting.  The final 
scheme for which there was evidence of reduced secondary care use was the VHA.  After 
restructuring, the rate of hospital admissions fell, bed days were reduced and per-patient 
expenditure fell by 25% [53].   
 
The remaining evidence was mixed (14/34 schemes) or unclear (5/34 schemes).  An evaluation of 
England’s cross charging policy, in which councils were fined a daily charge if they were solely 
responsible for a case of inpatient ‘bed blocking’ [37], identified that the downward trend in delayed 
                                                          
3
 The indigenous trials targeted aboriginal and Torre Strait Islander populations, whereas the study population in the 
mainstream trials was mixed (including indigenous people).  
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discharges accelerated after the legislation’s introduction [17].  We found an anecdotal report of 
success in reducing delayed discharges by one council that had set up a pooled fund with the local 
hospital to reduce hospitalizations and bed-blocking [54].  There was evidence of lower rates of 
delayed discharge in the Canadian model SIPA (Système de services intégrés pour personnes âgées 
en perte d’autonomie)4 [7, 11, 34, 55-58].  An RCT that compared SIPA’s approach (integrated 
management and pooled funds) with usual care found no difference in overall costs, but the delivery 
of care in SIPA shifted away from institutional settings and into the community. This was in part 
driven by a 50% drop in the incidence of delayed discharges.  In the Oxfordshire pooled budgets / 
lead commissioning model [21, 86], initial reductions in delayed transfers of care were not 
sustained.  In Wye Valley NHS Trust, an organisation that uses Health Act flexibilities to support 
integrated hospital, community and social care, cost savings of almost half a million pounds and 
reductions in delayed discharges were reported at the end of its first year of operation [52].  The 
interpretation of these findings is uncertain, because they were based on an uncontrolled before-
and-after comparison that neither adjusted for underlying trends, nor identified a counterfactual.  It 
is possible that the observed changes would have happened without an intervention, especially if 
the study group of individuals are selected for evaluation on the basis of their above-average 
utilisation (‘regression to the mean’ – see Appendix 4) [14].   
 
A difference-in-difference analysis of 15 of the 16 English Integrated Care Pilots (ICPs) found that 
integrated care was associated with significantly higher emergency admission rates, but rates of 
elective admissions and outpatient visits were significantly lower.  There was no significant 
difference in the use of accident and emergency services [15].  A subgroup analysis of six ICPs that 
used case management to target people deemed to be at high risk of admission found the same 
direction of effects, but the magnitudes were greater [15], p19. However, an inspection of mortality 
data over the six months following the evaluation suggested that the integrated care group were 
‘sicker’ than the matched controls, a confounding factor that could not be modelled from routinely 
available data [59].  Two of the ICP pilots, Cumbria PCT and Torbay, used IRMs across health and 
social care, but the evaluation did not attempt to isolate the effect of the funding approach.5   Owing 
to its different enrolment method,  the Torbay pilot was excluded from the national evaluation, and 
so the authors conducted a local evaluation of Torbay’s ICP [51]. When compared against a 
neighbouring area over a 3-year period, the rate of increase in Torbay’s emergency admissions was 
lower, and reductions in mean length of stay for older people were larger.  The evaluators concluded 
that Torbay had successfully reduced secondary care utilisation. 
 
In another scheme targeting this client group, findings for an impact on resource use were mixed.  
Funded at a cost of £60 million, the Pilot of Partnerships for Older People Projects (POPP) employed 
earlier, targeted interventions within community settings to promote health, well-being, and 
independence and to prevent or delay the need for hospital or institutional care [14].  The national 
evaluation compared POPP sites using difference-in-difference with geographical controls (usual 
care) and found a significantly greater reduction in emergency bed days; the authors concluded that 
POPP was likely to be cost-effective overall.  However, a more detailed analysis using a more 
sophisticated methodology suggested the picture was more equivocal [60].  This evaluation focused 
on a sub-set of eight interventions with the potential to avoid unplanned hospitalisation, and used a 
control group of prognostically matched individuals.  The evaluation found no evidence of a 
reduction in emergency admissions and in some instances there were more admissions in the 
intervention group than in the control group.   
 
                                                          
4
 A system of integrated care for older persons with disabilities 
5
 It is unclear whether the integrated resource mechanism was actually implemented in Cumbria [personal communication 
with evaluators, 06/05/13]. 
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“Overall we found that the POPP interventions we studied did not appear to have reduced use of 
acute hospitals. However, there were signs that one of the interventions reduced emergency 
hospital admissions for a high-risk subgroup” [60] (p. 30).   
 
This sub-group effect was found in only one of the eight interventions analysed. In this county-wide 
intervention, 23 integrated health and social care teams supported people with one or more long-
term conditions [14, 60].  When the data were analysed for 2,500 individuals who had received the 
intervention, emergency admissions were significantly lower only in the small subgroup (n=179) of 
individuals with high predictive risk scores [60](p26).  As explained in the methods section, data on 
the use of IRMs in individual POPP schemes was not available and so it is not possible to link the 
positive outcome in this particular intervention to a specific IRM.6  
 
Similarly, an analysis of a S/HMO II (Social Health Maintenance Organization, wave 2) identified 
reduced hospital admissions for a subgroup of people with two or more hospitalizations in the 
previous 12 months [61] (p64).  In both this case and the case of the POPP scheme evaluation [60], 
the inverse relationship between integrated care and hospital admission may not imply causation; 
rather, the findings may reflect a phenomenon known as ‘regression to the mean’ (see Appendix 4).   
 
The impact of integration on use of institutional (residential) care was evaluated in 11 schemes. 
Overall, findings were ambiguous: in four schemes, there was no significant impact, and in the 
remaining schemes the impact was positive (1/11), negative (2/11), mixed (2/11) or unclear (2/11).  
Amongst the English schemes, neither Care Trusts nor pooled budgets were found to affect the 
probability of nursing home admission [37], and a postal survey of mental health providers 
suggested that cross charging had improved placements for acute inpatients at the expense of 
mental health inpatients [62]. In the Darlington pilot, intervention patients were significantly less 
likely than controls to enter residential care [6].  Evidence from outside of the UK suggested that 
integrated interventions did not reduce the risk of nursing home placement.  In the US, short term 
improvements in PACE enrollees’ risk of nursing home placement were not sustained.  In the 
Social/Health Maintenance Organizations (S/HMO) models, findings were mixed.  The costs of 
nursing home care were significantly higher in first generation (S/HMO I) enrollees compared with 
the fee-for-service group; and in S/HMO II, which adopted a more targeted approach than S/HMO I, 
nursing home admission rates for community dwelling adults were significantly higher than for 
members of the traditional risk plan [7, 61] although in one site these patients were more likely to 
be subsequently discharged back into the community compared to fee-for-service patients [63].  In 
one of the first-round Australian RCTs (CareNet), intervention patients were twice as likely as 
controls to be admitted to a residential or nursing home [50]. 
 
Quality of care and user experience 
Quality of care was measured in a variety of ways in the studies reviewed, with many focusing on the 
views of staff, patients and carers about their experience with the integrated care schemes, 
collected either via surveys, focus groups or in some cases, anecdotally.  Results are mixed: the 
Australian trials [2] found that clients reported improved access to services and improved knowledge 
of health services; similarly, in the NW London pilot, some reported improved access [64]. The Audit 
Commission reported that user satisfaction in the Wye Valley integrated scheme was above the 
national average [37]. The whole-system evaluation of integrated care pilots in England [15] 
reported that 54% of staff involved in the schemes felt that patient care had improved, although 
patients reported some negative experiences such as not being able to see staff of their choice and 
feeling less involved in care decisions, whilst in the Somerset scheme [65] some mental health 
service users reported greater engagement.   Higher patient satisfaction was also reported in the 
                                                          
6
 Indeed, it is not clear that an IRM was used in this POPP scheme.  
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Darlington pilot [6, 7] and patients and carers involved in the Hertfordshire scheme [66, 67] were 
mainly positive.  Most (75%) of the ‘key informants’ surveyed in the POPP schemes [4] felt that the 
schemes led to improvements, including better access and a broader range of services, although the 
single quality of life measure showed some deterioration after the interventions.  In the Scottish 
evaluation of Integrated Resource Framework, delivery staff were less confident at the end of the 
study period than they had been at start that the integration agenda would improve patient care 
[68].   
 
Some studies found little impact: the Somerset partnership [65] found that restructuring had not 
adversely affected the quality of care but was associated with short-term reductions in staff job 
satisfaction and morale [69].  The Minnesota Senior Health Options initiative found no substantial 
differences in satisfaction between comparison groups [9]; nor did the PACE programmes [3]. 
 
In terms of more objective process measures of quality, some evidence is provided of improvements 
such as increased numbers of care plans produced for dementia patients and greater use of testing 
for diabetes [64, 70-78]; the VHA scheme reported significant improvements in the quality of care 
relative to Medicare fee-for-service and generally outperformed Medicare and Medicaid on a range 
of quality measures [79, 80].  The Darlington pilot found a significantly reduced need for additional 
(more intensive) care and a higher level of social activities for those in the intervention group (care 
at home) compared with the control group of long-stay hospital patients [6].  The Commonwealth 
Care Alliance in the USA reported high scores for some HEDIS (national) process measures of care 
quality [81].  Others showed little effect e.g., the S/HMO II scheme in the USA concluded: “Quality of 
care was assessed by examining the provision of routine preventive care, frequency of physician 
visits for persons with specified chronic conditions, and rates of hospitalization for enrollees with 
potentially avoidable hospital conditions. Overall, there was no evidence that the quality of care 
provided to S/HMO II enrollees was consistently better than care received by enrollees in other 
Medicare HMOs or by Medicare beneficiaries using traditional Medicare fee-for-service coverage” 
[61].   
 
Barriers, facilitators and unintended consequences 
The large demonstration projects in the US and the Australian co-ordinated care trials invested 
considerable resources to investigate why their first efforts to improve outcomes and reduce costs 
had been unsuccessful.  They identified the barriers to implementation, and adapted the models of 
care and financing approaches to improve their chances of success.   
 
Perhaps the primary ‘barrier’ to emerge from the review was the difficulty of implementing financial 
integration, despite statutory and regulatory measures to support their application.  This problem 
affected the Australian CCT2 trials, many of the English schemes (e.g. Cumbria PCT, the NW London 
pilot, pooled budgets arrangements), both Scottish schemes, and the Welsh joint commissioning 
experiment.  The POPP evaluation found that translating cost reductions into an actual cost saving 
was usually impossible, due to difficulties in transferring funds across care boundaries. Where it was 
feasible, this was due to prior agreements at senior management level. Preventive based projects 
were expecting to be able to utilise savings from reduced emergency bed days in order to sustain 
their programmes in the longer term but these system wide transfers did not materialise [4]. 
 
The Australian CCT1 succeeded in achieving pooled funds, but the system lacked the qualities 
needed to operationalise co-ordinated care, primarily because market mechanisms failed to take 
account of underlying incentive structures and social processes [82].  Funds were costly to pool, but 
failed to break down service boundaries (p226) or give purchasers control over clients’ service use (p 
225) [85].  In other words, purchasing power was weak and purchasers were unable to facilitate 
tailored, timely care.  The reasons for this were complex, but provider autonomy was an important 
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factor.  For example, some services identified in the care plan were accessible only if clients met pre-
existing eligibility criteria [13]; providers decided who was eligible to access services, and so care 
plans could not be used to authorise purchase of services from the pooled funds [82].  The difficulty 
of challenging provider autonomy was also evident the SIPA model (Canada), PACE and the 
Wisconsin Partnership Program (US), the Integrated Health & Social Services Boards (Northern 
Ireland) and Torbay (England).   
 
Difficulties in the purchaser-provider relationship were also identified in the S/HMO I evaluation.  
The demonstration failed to integrate acute and long-term care because relations between S/HMO 
care coordinators (typically social workers) and physicians were ‘poorly developed’ [61].  For this 
reason, the second generation S/HMO models adopted ‘stronger geriatric approaches’ that sought 
to engage physicians directly in care coordination.  Physician engagement was also a problem 
reported in Torbay [51] and in the Australian trials, where some GPs found the care planning 
bureaucratic, burdensome, and of questionable value – particularly for clients with lower level care 
needs [8](ch 14).  Even within the integrated care team itself, relationship difficulties arose.  Non-GP 
care coordinators reported communication difficulties with GPs and resented the fact that they 
received a lower reimbursement rate than GPs for care planning [8]. 
 
Some issues, however, appear to be relevant primarily for the UK.  Differences in performance 
frameworks, priorities and governance were highlighted in many of the UK schemes included in our 
review, although these factors were also identified as barriers to integration in Swedish schemes.   A 
good example from England is Care Trusts, where practical difficulties to integration may arise if staff 
members work under different pay, pension schemes or human resources support.  As Care Trusts 
have an NHS governance and performance management framework, local government may 
therefore perceive Care Trusts as a ‘health takeover’ that undermines local accountability: 
 
“Statutory responsibilities and accountabilities of individual organisations .. are not removed by 
entering into arrangements for integrated governance, whether of the care trust form or other 
kinds of partnership” [83]. 
 
With regard to linking different IT systems, this problem appeared to be generic and was reported by 
schemes in Australia, England and the US.   
 
One important agency relationship is between the client and the provider.  Self-management was 
found to be critical to successful care coordination in the Australian CCT1 trials, emphasizing the 
importance of patient education [84]. Therefore, demand side factors, as well as supply side 
changes, need to be considered [85].  It is not clear how many of the schemes in our review assessed 
whether there were difficulties engaging clients, or whether individual-level factors such as 
treatment adherence contributed to findings.  However, recruitment difficulties were reported in 
both Australian CCTs, PRISMA (Canada), S/HMO II (US) and PACE (US), which suggests it may be 
challenging to engage eligible individuals.  It is also plausible that the integrated schemes have been 
developed without user involvement, and that they are therefore failing to address users’ preferred 
models of care.   For instance, adult day care is a key feature of integrated management in the PACE 
scheme and some clients find this model unappealing [16].  Therefore, there is an implicit ‘selection 
bias’ operating with the scheme itself.   
 
Unintended consequences of the schemes were not systematically reported, but several emerged 
from the review.  Evaluations of PACE found evidence of ‘cream skimming’, with some schemes 
excluding those with psychiatric disorders or substance abuse problems [16].  The S/HMO I 
evaluations found that clients deemed to be ‘nursing home certifiable’ were less frail and complex 
than expected – which may have been due to the higher fee this paid for this client group 
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(incentivising ‘upcoding’).  In the evaluation of cross-charging in England, there was anecdotal 
evidence that the scheme led to poor outcomes for patients in terms of “overly hasty” discharge and 
increased risk of readmission [17].  In the Australian CCT1 trials, over half of GPs thought clients 
outside of the trial were adversely affected in terms of their access to services [8]. 
 
Discussion 
The analytical framework we considered earlier suggested a range of potential impacts arising from 
IRMs, as listed in Table 1.  From the large volume of literature on integrated care, we identified 38 
schemes that involved at least some element of integrated resources for health and social care and 
had been subject to an evaluation of some type. Assessing the implications of the evaluations was 
hindered by the fact that some evaluations covered a large number of different schemes that varied 
in the degree to which they involved the integration of resources and thus results applied at a 
general level, rather than specifically to schemes with IRMs.  In addition, as IRMs are not 
implemented in isolation of other features of integrated care, the impacts reported in evaluations 
cannot be attributed solely to the IRM element: we have no way of knowing how a scheme with an 
IRM compares to the same scheme without an IRM element.  Only one evaluation attempted to 
compare integrated care with an IRM to integrated care without one (Minnesota Senior Health 
Options (MSHO)).  The study “failed to show any remarkable benefits from the merging of payments 
from Medicare and Medicaid… [there was] little evidence that shifting this care to a consolidated 
funding approach managed through a series of health insurance plans with the addition of care 
coordination has produced improvements in outcomes” [9]. 
 
The evidence we have reviewed is mixed so it is not possible to answer definitively the question 
posed - “are IRMs effective and cost-effective?”.  Overall, the impact on health outcomes seems 
neutral or, at best, modest, although unlikely to be negative; the impact on costs seems similarly 
modest or neutral, although higher, as well as lower hospital use (emergency care especially) 
amongst the intervention group has been reported. The latter may be due to the case finding effect 
associated with other aspects of the integrated care schemes or to a lack of comparability between 
groups, despite attempts at matching.  Although costs savings are equivocal, there was some 
evidence of changes in the care pathway with some substitution of non-hospital care. As described 
earlier, the schemes varied in terms of the patient or client group selected and the type of services 
available for clients to access.  It is possible that the impact on health related outcomes may in 
principle be more limited for some groups and schemes and instead we might expect access to 
services and the “softer” measures of satisfaction and quality to be affected instead. The evidence 
on such measures was largely positive with some exceptions mainly related to clients not feeling 
involved in decisions or their inability to choose which health professionals they see.  
 
We started from the premise that, from an economic perspective, IRMs could potentially be a useful 
mechanism to achieve many of the benefits expected from integrated care.  The evidence does not 
support this premise definitively.  Ironically, although the integration of finances should in principle 
be a major facilitator for supporting integrated care, the practical, cultural and technical difficulties 
involved in achieving it, also appears to be a major barrier for many of the schemes.  It is possible 
that some of the more negative results arise because of difficulties in operationalising the IRM, 
rather than in the principle of IRMs per se. However, the evidence does not allow us to draw more 
definitive conclusions than this and suggests caution in assuming that integrating resources, even if 
difficult to achieve, will be a panacea if only it can be achieved.   
 
Compared with ‘usual care’, schemes that integrated funds and resources to support integrated care 
seldom led to improved health outcomes, and no scheme demonstrated a sustained and long term 
reduction in hospital use.  The case for integrated funding has therefore not yet been demonstrated, 
but this does not mean that it cannot succeed or that policy makers should disregard this approach.   
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Table 5: The evidence on the impacts of integrated care 
Potential Impact  Comment  What does evidence show? 
Improve access to 
care 
The integrated care team knows which additional services the user needs – the 
levels of Hd1 and Sd1 – to maintain or improve his health status. They also know 
how to access these services and can advise on or facilitate his access to services.  
Evidence is largely positive.  However, provider autonomy and higher 





If additional discretionary care is given early enough in the disease pathway, this 
maintains the individual’s health status above level 4 so that he does not need to 
be hospitalized.  
Evidence is positive for some groups; but negative in others (ie, 
increased admissions).  There are very few longer term studies, and 
none that demonstrates a sustained reduction in unplanned 
admissions.  
Increase community 
care (health and 
social care) 
To avoid admission to hospital or an institution, the individual needs more care 
than he is currently receiving from care package 0. Thus, preventative community 
health and social care may be required. Although the model does not show this, 
elective hospital care may also help reduce the risk of avoidable unplanned 
admissions.  
Evidence is positive to some degree for community services; and not 
clear for institutional care  
In reality, the quality and type of care package needs to be tailored for 
the individual and early intervention may be infeasible if additional 
start-up funds are not available. 
Reduce total costs  Higher costs at time 1, caused by the utilization of Hd1 and Sd1, may reduce total 
costs in time 2 if subsequent hospital and residential care use is reduced or 
averted. 
Neutral largely.  No longer-term evidence that total costs can be 
reduced, although some shorter-term evidence suggested this may be 
possible if efforts are sustained (Australian CCT2).   
Improve outcomes Better resourced packages of care such as packages 1 and 2 can maintain or even 
improve health status.  
Neutral or positive.  If clients’ health is degenerating, schemes may help 
to slow the rate of deterioration, rather than improve health. This 
underscores the need for careful evaluation.   
Improve the quality 
of care 
The quality of care services is static in this model. However, earlier intervention 
could be conceived as better quality care per se.   
Few studies measured the quality of care, and they employed different 
measures of quality, with mixed results. As quality skimping is a 
potential unintended consequence of capitation budgets, it is important 
that this risk is appropriately monitored in new schemes.  
Reduce length of 
stay 
The team can ensure that appropriate levels of discretionary social care (Sd3) 
services are available to support timely discharge. 
There was evidence that cross charging and pooled funding could 
reduce delayed discharges in the short term – though these were not 
sustained in the longer term.  Measures that penalise emergency 




Higher use of community services (Hd1 and Sd1) may delay or remove the 
individual’s need for long term residential care.  
Equivocal: relatively few studies assessed this outcome, and findings 
were very mixed.  In two schemes, those receiving integrated care were 
more likely to be admitted to a nursing home.  
Improve patient and 
user experience of 
care 
Intervention to reduce avoidable morbidity may improve the individual’s 
experience of care. However, this depends how patients/users are involved in 
care decisions, and delivery process. Aggressive interventions to avert 
hospitalisation for individuals who are frail and vulnerable may be inappropriate.  
Positive largely although some negatives.  There was no standardised 
measurement across schemes.  Measuring the process of care and user 
/carer experience provides important information about the quality of 
care.  
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Integrating care for people with health and social care needs is a highly complex task, subject to 
decisions and actions made by numerous agents who typically operate under different and evolving 
systems of incentives, frameworks, priorities and governance.  The system shapes agents behaviour, 
but agent behaviour also shapes the system, and this iterative process makes the impact of 
integrated funding difficult to predict.   Integrating funds across health and social care services is not 
a panacea that will reliably resolve the practical and policy challenges of providing integrated care, 
as success is contingent upon many factors – but this does not mean that success is an unattainable 
‘Holy Grail’, but only that expectations should be realistic.  
 
If integrated funds are to be the model for the future, attention needs to focus on how they can be 
facilitated and it will be important not to underestimate the efforts required to forge and to 
maintain the relationships that underpin the financial mechanisms.  Uptake of the financial 
flexibilities in England has been low, which may indicate that cultural and governance differences 
cannot be ignored or resolved by financial incentives.  Even if these differences are resolved at 
management level, provider autonomy remains a barrier to access for some healthcare services.   
 
Case finding means that overall system costs may increase even if the intervention is cost-effective. 
Moreover, if schemes improve co-ordination and focus greater attention on patient needs, there is a 
good chance that co-ordinated care “reveals rather than resolves” unmet need [84, 85].  Overall, 
although this may be a beneficial outcome for society, it may increase, rather than reduce, costs. 
 
The greatest potential for cost savings is for high risk clients, that is where the client group is most at 
risk of expensive hospital care and this is borne out by the evidence (e.g. POPP schemes at tertiary 
level) – though this may be due to regression to the mean. The translation of cost reductions into 
actual cost savings is not easy – IRMs should facilitate this but there are still obstacles.  For example, 
if bed days are reduced, the cash savings will not be released for community and social care unless 
beds are not filled by others.  The more ambitious claims for integrated care, such as shifting care 
and resources from hospital into community indeed appear to remain ambitions, rather than 
achievements. 
 
In England, new schemes were often introduced in the context of a raft of existing and evolving 
policy initiatives, which makes the evaluation of their effects methodologically challenging.  For this 
reason, new schemes need to be rolled out cautiously and their evaluation should strive to 
incorporate appropriate controls.  Evaluations should seek to consistently measure a range of effects 
and costs, including the routine assessment of unintended consequences and barriers to 
implementation, and patient-reported measures of outcomes (PROMs) and experience (PREMs).  
Some of the existing measures used in the NHS Outcomes Framework may be useful if data are 
analysed at the appropriate level.  
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Appendix 1: Search strategy for electronic databases 
Searches were originally run in October 2009. These were updated in July 2012, searching on all 
publication years, and deduplicating against the original endnote library. A second update was 
carried out in February 2013 searching 1999 onwards, and deduplicating against the previous 
endnote library. 
 
1  pooled budget$.ti,ab. 
2  total budget$.ti,ab. 
3  single budget.ti,ab. 
4  total budget$.ti,ab. 
5  lead commission$.ti,ab. 
6  lead contract$.ti,ab. 
7  (integrat$ and (activity adj2 funding)).ti,ab. 
8  (integrat$ and (activity adj2 finance$)).ti,ab. 
9  ((integrat$ and activity) adj2 payment$).ti,ab. 
10  (integrat$ and capitation payment$).ti,ab. 
11  (integrat$ and (case adj2 payment$)).ti,ab. 
12  (integrat$ adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
13  (join$ adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or payment$)).ti,ab. 
14  (shared adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
15  (unified adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
16  (whole system$ adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
17  (partner$ adj2 (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
18  ((chains adj2 care) and (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment)).ti,ab. 
19  ((care adj2 package$) and (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or 
payment$)).ti,ab. 
20  or/1-19  
21  shmo$.mp. 
22  social health maintenance organi?ation$.ti,ab. 
23  social HMO$.mp. 
24  (social adj2 health adj2 maintenance organi?ation$).ti,ab. 
25  (health adj2 social care partnership$).ti,ab. 
26 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25  
27  delivery of health care, integrated/  
28  (commissioning or financ$ or budget$ or funding or reimburse$ or payment$).ti. 
29  27 and 28  
30  20 or 26 or 29  
31  asia/ or africa/ or south america/  
32  30 not 31 
33  limit 32 to english language  
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Appendix 2: Schemes included in the review 








Australia Coordinated Care Trials: round 
1 (CCT1)  
[2, 8, 57, 85, 86] 
 
See also: 
 CareNet (Illawarra New 
South Wales) 
 North Eastern Health Care 
Network (Victoria) 
 Care 21 (South Australia) 
 Hornsby Linked Care (New 
South Wales) 
 CareWorks (Southern 
Region of Tasmania) 





pooled funds  
Overview: 
Joint venture between 
commonwealth, state and territory 
governments. Total cost for 
mainstream trials: AUS $120m ($11k 
pr client) (ch 2). 
CCT 1 ran from 1997 to 1999, included 
13 trials.  4 were targeted at 




The trials were intended to be cost 
neutral [50] and to deliver improved 
health and wellbeing [2] 
Clients: 
Addressed health and social care for 
people with chronic and complex 
needs; client group varied across the 
trials.  
Integration model: 
All trials included comprehensive 
client assessment; a care plan; service 
integration.  Trials adopted one of 3 
models (or devised a hybrid) (ch13): 
Model 1: GP care coordinator model - 
in which the GP was solely responsible 
for all aspects of the care coordination 
process 
Model 2: GP care coordinator plus 
service coordinator model - in which 
aspects of the care coordination 
process were varyingly shared 
between the two 
Model 3: non-GP care coordinator 
model - in which the GP’s contribution 
to the medical aspects of care 
planning and ongoing medical 
management of clients was an integral 
The ‘trials’ were “innovative approaches to 
the funding and delivery”.  The 
intervention groups were ‘coordinated 
care’; the control groups were ‘usual care’, 
but this was poorly defined.  
 
Health assessed by SF-36 (a quality of life 
measure that assesses physical and mental 
health; higher scores indicate better 
health). 
 
Trial duration was intended to be 2 years, 
but ranged from 761 to 944 days (although 
‘treatment’ was typically 12 months or 
less); 3 trials were randomised, one area 
ran 4 subtrials (2 RCTs), the others used 
geographical controls. 
Effectiveness 
In general, the intervention did not consistently 
deliver better health benefits than usual care 
(assessed by the SF-36 [50]). 
Individual trials identified significant differences in 
various components of the SF-36, but as multiple 
comparisons were made, some significant results 
may have been due to chance.  
Service use and costs 
Overall, intervention groups did not consistently 
reduce hospital admissions, readmissions or length 
of stay.  However, “significant reductions in 
hospitalisations” were achieved in 3 of the 9 
mainstream trials ([2]; app C, p16).  
Trials developed funding models of far greater 
flexibility than existed elsewhere in the Australian 
health care system. Nonetheless, the anticipated 
reductions in Medicare, pharmaceutical and hospital 
services that were intended to cover the costs of 
care coordination were not apparent, although 
community service use increased [8]( ch 2). 
The additional costs of care coordination were not 
covered by the efficiency gains of the care 
coordination process, including flexible uses of 
funds.  Strategies for effective service substitution 
and financial management of the pooled funds (i.e. 
defining the benefit basket) were underdeveloped 
([2]; app C, p.17).  
Subgroup analysis suggested that cost savings were 
more likely to be achieved in patients with prior 
hospital admission [84].  
Barriers 
“The system had some key features of a coordinated 
care model but none of the qualities that were 
needed to operationalise them.”[82] 
Primary and secondary care doctors were ‘private’ 
and funded by fee for service (FFS) [13], which 
reinforced a reactive rather than a planned model of 
care [84]. GPs were therefore reluctant to refer 
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component of care coordination. 
IRM: 
All trials received infrastructure 
funding and pooled funding. Trial 
budgets funded by health and social 
government programmes, and all 
trials pooled funds for Medicare 
(MBS), drug (PBS) and hospital 
inpatient services (ch 2).  Three trials 
did not receive pooled social care 
(HACC) funds (SA Healthplus; SHCN; 
TeamCare) – these are excluded from 
the key findings summary.  
 
patients to alternative care providers (community 
nurses, pharmacists), as this could affect their 
business once the trial concluded.  
GPs were solely responsible for service substitution, 
but had no control over admissions or discharges, 
which are under the authority of specialists.  GPs did 
not receive information on pooled expenditure and 
were not liable for overspend [82].  
Some services identified in the written care plan 
were accessible only if clients met pre-existing 
eligibility criteria [13]; care plans could not be used 
to authorise purchase of services from the pooled 
funds, so money did not follow the patient [82].  
Pooled funds incurred substantial administrative 
costs, but failed to break down service boundaries 
(p226) or give purchasers control over clients’ 
service use (p 225) [85].   
Other benefits 
The indigenous trials uncovered high levels of unmet 
need, necessitating additional funding. The trials 
improved access to appropriate services and built 
capacity.  
Increased use of preventative care (e.g. smoking 
cessation); better technological infrastructure; 
participant satisfaction good [87].  
Limitations of the study 
The design of the RCT did not recognise that patients 
were clustered within practices, which increased the 
chance of a false positive result (type I error).   
Nonetheless, outcomes were generally 
‘disappointing’ [87].   
Timescale: on average, participants were ‘treated’ 
for 12 months or less, which may not have been 
sufficient to impact complex illness.  The SF-36 may 
not be sensitive enough for this short time span [87].  
Eligibility criteria were relaxed in response to 
recruitment difficulties, and some participants would 
have had less capacity to benefit than the target 
population.  Interventions were not always tailored 
to need (one size fits all) [87].    
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Australia  From CCT1 
CareNet (Illawarra New South 
Wales) 




pooled funds  
Clients: 
Co-ordinated care for frail people aged 
65+ (45+ if Aboriginal) with multiple 
service (medical and social) needs, or 
at high risk of falling (appendix g) 
Integration model: 
Model 3 – The non-GP care 
coordination approach. Care-
coordinators employed to work 
alongside GP in developing care plan, 
then act as agent to negotiate service 
provision for the client. (ch13) 
IRM: 
MBS, PBS, Hospital inpatient, DVA, 
HACC, Community Nursing A$11.8m 
RCT (2:1) 
883 days (Aug 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
1310 / 678 
 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: no significant differences between 
intervention and control groups.  
Service use & costs 
Higher pharmaceutical costs for the intervention 
group. There was no significant difference in the 
admission rate, risk of admission or LoS between the 
groups. Intervention group twice as likely to be 
admitted to a residential or nursing home [50]. 
Barriers 
Clients were healthier than comparable service 
users.  Pooled funds did not lead to more flexible 
delivery; providers continued to prioritise high need 
individuals and were unwilling to accept the care co-
ordinators’ assessments [50]. 
Other 
The validity of the randomisation is unclear, as GPs 
treated patients in both groups, so clinical care for 
controls may have been ‘contaminated’ [50]. 
Australia From CCT1 
North Eastern Health Care 
Network (Victoria) 
[8] 




pooled funds  
Clients: 
Individuals with complex care needs: 
multiple medical conditions, 
dependent on others, and may have 
psychosocial conditions (e.g. 
Alzheimer's Disease and other 
dementias, stroke, Parkinson's 
Disease, severe arthritis, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease and 
heart failure). The client group also 
includes older people with poor health 
who are at risk of frequent 
hospitalisation. 
Integration model: 
Model 2 – The GP Care Coordinator 
with Service Coordinator approach 
IRM: 
MBS, PBS, Hospital inpatient and 
outpatient, DVA, RDNS, HACC; A$5m 
RCT (1:1) 
761 days (Dec 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
526 / 530 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: no significant differences between 
intervention and control groups.  
Service use & costs 
There was no significant difference in the admission 
rate, risk of admission or LoS between the groups.  
Barriers 
Lack of specificity in eligibility criteria was a 
challenge to identify the relevant population [8](ch 
9). The trial subsequently drafted a list of eligible 
diagnoses (see clients) and exclusions (DVA clients 
participating in the ‘DVA preventative care trial’ and 
DVA clients who were receiving renal dialysis and 
had a DVA annual health care plan). Recruitment was 
below target, and the trial ceased to rely solely on 
GPs for recruitment [8](ch 9).  
Australia From CCT1 






pooled funds  
Clients: 
Older (65+, or 55+ if Aboriginal) 
people with complex medical 
conditions and/or are multiple users 
of HACC funded services available in 
the catchment area. Excludes those in 
permanent nursing home or hostel 
care. Distinguished care planning and 
Geographical controls 
852 days (Sept 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
609/174 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: significant decrease (worsening) in physical 
component scale for intervention group relative to 
control. This was due to a greater deterioration in 
the physical functioning of the intervention group.  
Service use & costs 
There was no significant difference in the admission 
rate, but LoS was significantly longer in the 
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service coordination.  
Integration model: 
Model 3 – The non GP care 
coordination approach. Care planner 
developed plan with GP; plan then 
passed to service coordinator for 
implementation (ch 13).  
IRM: 
Funds pooled from the South 
Australian Health Commission, HACC, 
MBS, and PBS. Funds from hospital 
services contributed to the Trial pool 
on the basis of resources linked to 
specific diagnosis groups relevant to 
frail older clients. 
MBS, PBS, Hospital inpatient (notional 
only), DVA, HACC, RDNS; A$5.5m 
intervention group. 
Barriers 
Recruitment fell short of targeted levels, with less 
than half the anticipated number of control group 
clients. GP referrals only started to come in 
significant numbers towards the end of the 
recruitment period, and some who were eligible 
could not join the trial because their GP was not 
participating.  The trial separated the organisation of 
client care into planning and supervision that were 
the responsibility of care planners, and monitoring 
and maintenance which were the responsibility of 
service coordinators. GPs liked this arrangement, but 
preferred to have a single service coordinator 
managing all their trial patients [8](ch 14). 
Australia From CCT1 






pooled funds  
Clients: 
People with complex care: includes 
older people, people with disabilities, 
and people with complex medical 
needs or relatively high need of 
support to undertake independent 
activities of daily living.  
Clients have a high level of utilisation 
of specified community and health 
services with the likelihood that their 
need for these services will continue.  
Integration model: 
Hybrid model of care coordination 
(Model 1 and Model 3). This included 
Care coordinator (GP and non GPs) 
and GP (if not a care coordinator) and 
Super Care Coordinator (full-time non 
GPs). 
IRM: 
Pooled MBS, PBS, Hospital 
inpatient/outpatient, DVA, HACC, 
RDNS and private health insurance; 
A$11.5m 
Geographical controls (“similar profile”) 
852 days (Sept 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
1150 / 425 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: no significant differences between 
intervention and control groups.  
Service use & costs 
The admission rate was significantly higher in the 
intervention group than in the controls. 
Barriers 
The trial suffered high attrition rates (45% over the 
study period) [8](ch 9).  Some GPs found the care 
planning bureaucratic, burdensome, and of 
questionable value – particularly for clients with 
lower level care needs [8](ch 14).  Over half of GPs 
thought access to services was negatively impacted 
for clients outside of the trial (ch 14). Non-GP care 
coordinators reported communication difficulties 
with GPs and resented their lower reimbursement 
rate for care planning.  
Australia From CCT1 






pooled funds  
Clients: 
Frail older people with complex and 
long term care needs: people aged 65 
or over (55 for aboriginal individuals ) 
with chronic medical condition 
requiring ongoing medical treatment; 
Geographical controls 
852 days (Sept 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
819 / 372 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: no significant differences between 
intervention and control groups.  
Service use & costs 
There was no significant difference between the 
groups in the admission rate, risk of admission or 
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and/or at least one admission to an 
Acute facility or Department of 
Emergency Medicine presentation in 
the past 12 months; and/or regularly 
using at least 2 HACC services; and/or 
have been referred to Community 
Options or Aged Care Assessment 
Team, or may be at risk because of 
dementia, falls, poor mobility, 
incontinence, social isolation, or carer 
stress. 
Integration model: 
Model 3 – The non GP care 
coordination approach 
IRM: 
MBS, PBS, Hospital inpatient and 
outpatient, DVA, HACC; Private Health 




Most care coordinators were unfamiliar with the 
service brokerage component of their role and found 
this challenging.  They were also confused about the 
need for data collection and found the electronic 
data entry system time consuming and onerous 
[8](ch 14). 
Australia From CCT1 
CarePlus (ACT: Australian 
Capital Territory) 




pooled funds  
Clients: 




Model 1 – The GP approach 
 
IRM: 
MBS, PBS, Hospital inpatient, HACC , 




852 (Sept 97 – Dec 99) (live phase) 
754 / 517 
Effectiveness 
SF-36: no significant differences between 
intervention and control groups.  
Service use & costs 
There was no significant difference in the admission 
rate, or risk of admission between the groups, but 
LoS was significantly shorter in the intervention 
group.  
Barriers 
The purchasers were GPs, who were solely 
responsible for service substitution. However, they 
had no financial liability for the pooled funds, 
received no information on pooled expenditure, and 
had almost no control over hospitalisation 
(specialists responsible for admissions /discharges). 
Money did not follow the client; GPs did not consult 
other providers in the care plans. 
Incentives for providers were weak, with pharmacy 
and community nursing being the ‘most responsive’ 
though GPs rarely referred clients to them [82].  GPs 
are paid on FFS basis [84], so have little incentive to 
refer patients to alternative primary care providers.  
Other: 
Data linkage facilitated, but there were 
confidentiality concerns when attempting to 
generate cross-sectoral care records [82] 
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Australia Coordinated Care Trials: round 
2 (CCT2) [2] 
See also: 
 Coordinated Health Care 
(CHC) 






pooled funds  
Overview 
CCT2 ran from 2005 to 2007 and 
comprised 5 ‘trials’, targeted at 
Indigenous (n=3) and mainstream 
populations (n=2). Joint venture 
between commonwealth (primary 
care), state (hospital care) and 
territory governments. A$33.2m (S2, 
p11) 
Aims: 
Tested different approaches for 
enhancing primary care, improving 
access, enhancing integration and 
improving health and well being. 
Clients:  
People with chronic and complex care 
needs. 
Mainstream trials were randomised 
and targeted older people.  The 
indigenous trials targeted younger 
people (e.g. 16 to 45 for PAC) 
Integration model: 
All trials included comprehensive 
client assessment; a care plan; service 
integration. 
IRM: 
‘Risk-based capitation model’ was 
created at the end of CCT1 to support 
a more rigorous and generic fund-
pooling approach in CCT2. Capitation 
model designed to represent the cost 
of usual care for this client group [2] 
(p18, pp46 ff). 
Social support / HACC services were 
provided, but unclear whether these 
were paid for from the pooled funds 
(T188; T264). 
2 mainstream trials were RCTs, and both 
had been CCT1 trials (p. 50). 
1. Team Care Health II (TCHII) (p69) 
2. Coordinated Health Care (CHC) (p73) 
Indigenous trials were not randomised. 
Two were whole population studies 
(Sunrise Health Service SHS; Partnership 
for Aboriginal Care, PAC), SWAMSAC 
(South West Aboriginal Medical Service 
Aboriginal Corporation) recruited from a 
GP catchment area.  
Compared with ‘usual care’.  
Trial duration: 3 years [87] 
Outcomes:  
SF-1, Geriatric Depression scale, EQ-5D.  
Self reported outcomes from focus groups. 
Selected as more sensitive instruments 
than SF-36 [87]. 
Effectiveness 
Self reported improvements in health and wellbeing 
were supported by health outcome assessments only 
in one of the two mainstream trials (TCHII).  In all 
trials, clients reported that access to services had 
improved.  
Service use & costs 
There was a greater degree of service substitution 
(more primary care, less inpatient use) for the 
intervention groups compared with controls. No trial 
absorbed the costs of care coordination, although 
trend analysis indicated that this was a possible long-
term outcome. (s2, p13) Intervention group costs 
were significantly higher than control group costs 
when clients were frail and elderly, partly because of 
the costs of care coordination.  
Barriers 
Co-working of GPs and trained health staff (nurses) 
was critical to successful care coordination, but 
recruitment difficulties and excessive workloads for 
nursing staff were common.  
Electronic communication, networking and data 
flows were not fully achieved.  Poor management 
and poor systems did not self-correct, and extra 
measures were needed to address these (particularly 
for the indigenous trials).  
Other: 
While flexible funding arrangements were pursued 
by all trials neither of the mainstream trials achieved 
a true pooling of funds (s2, p18).  Service utilisation 
could not be monitored against the pooled funds (s2, 
p17). 
Australia From CCT2 
Coordinated Health Care (CHC)  
[2]  
Link to CCT1: CHC was also a 
CCT1 trial, managed by the 
North Eastern Health Care 




pooled funds  
Clients: 
Older or frail people with chronic and 
complex needs and younger people 
with chronic conditions. (S4, p43) 
The target group for CHC was older 
and sicker than the TCHII trial (S5, 
p121) 
Integration model: 
Model 2 – The GP Care Coordinator 
RCT (2:1) 
15 months 
1108 / 417 
 
Existing healthcare system 
Urban setting. Well developed health care 
system with other large scale co-ordinated 
care initiatives ongoing.(S4, p43) 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Control group patients reported significantly higher 
HRQoL at baseline. There were no significant 
differences between the mean scores for general 
health for the intervention and control groups at 
either the baseline or six-month measurement 
points, and no changes for either group over time. 
The trial reported positive participant outcomes in 
terms of access to services and level of knowledge of 
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with Service Coordinator approach 
(nurses). Home based assessment, 
multidisciplinary care planning, service 
coordination.  
IRM: 
Funds pool: CHC had the ‘purest’ 
approach to fund pooling of all the 
trials, through cash-outs from all 
major funders/service providers. 
$14.4m pooled from inpatient ($5.9m, 
only partly pooled), primary care 
(MBS/PBS – $6.3m) and community 
care ($2.1m).(s5, p126) . The intention 
was also to include pooled funds from 
HACC (s6, p136); it is not clear 
whether this actually happened.  
Per capita annual spend: A$12,196 
 
the health system. 
Service use & costs 
The trial did not achieve service substitution and 
reduction in inpatient costs at a sufficient level to 
absorb the costs of care coordination. (p27-8) Before 
taking coordination costs into account (A$1,433 
annual per capita cost), per capita costs were very 
similar between the groups (s5, p125). 
Towards the end of the trial, there was a trend 
towards service substitution, with inpatient services 
falling relative to the control group, particularly with 
respect to avoidable hospital admissions. (s5, p130). 
Barriers 
The trial successfully overcame early stakeholder 
relationship and management issues. Perhaps 
because of these early difficulties the trial struggled 
to reach even reduced recruitment targets; coupled 
with the short time frame of the trials, the study was 
probably under powered to detect a meaningful 
difference in outcomes.  
Nevertheless, by end trial CHC was recognised as a 
desirable model for inclusion in the overall Victorian 
DHS planning care coordination process. 
Although intervention participants reported better 
access, education and knowledge of the care system, 
they seemed unaware of the care planning process. 
(s.5 p128) 
“In the case of the community care pool, final 
agreement could not be reached between providers 
and the CHC trial.” (s6, p132) 
However, some funds were pooled across health and 
social care (s2, p549-550).  
Australia From CCT2 
Team Care Health II (TCHII)  






pooled funds  
Clients: 
People (50+) with chronic and 
complex conditions, including CVD, 
musculoskeletal, endocrine or 
metabolic, psychological and 
respiratory problems. (s4, p39) Clients 
were in the early course of their 
condition. (s.4 p 43) 
Integration model: 
Model 2 – The GP Care Coordinator 
with Service Coordinator approach 
(community nurses linked to practice). 
GP assessment, multidisciplinary care 
planning, service coordination.  
RCT (2:1) 
2 years 
1774 / 946 
Existing healthcare system 
Urban setting. Inner regions healthcare 
system well resourced; outer region less 
well resourced (S4, p43)  
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
At 12 months: significant difference between the 
intervention and control groups, with intervention 
participants reporting better general health, less 
depression and better HRQoL. (S5, p99). 
Service use & costs 
Total cost of service provision rose at a higher rate 
for the control group than the intervention group – 
an initial increase following entry to the trial 
followed by a flattening and perhaps a reduction at 
later periods. 
Intervention participants received more MBS 
services and less inpatient services during the trial 
compared with controls.  However, total per capita 




Funds pool: the main sources of funds 
were DHA’s ‘cashed out’ MBS and PBS 
contributions amounting to $10.0m, 
Queensland Health’s in-kind 
contribution of $9.2m for inpatient 
services, and a range of contributions 
to HACC services and expected 
substitution of inpatient services. 
TCHII also received $2.6m for care 
coordination set-up and activities. The 
total ongoing coordinated care fund 
pool was $21.5m (s5, p105);  
Per capita annual spend: A$8,333 
costs were higher for the intervention group, after 
taking the costs of care co-ordination (A$557 
annually per capita) into account. (s5, p105) (s6, 
p136) 
Trial achieved service substitution between inpatient 
care and community care. “Had the trial progressed 
for longer, evidence suggests that it would have 
been at least cost neutral in achieving these 
outcomes, even after incorporating the cost of care 
coordination.” (s5, p109) 
Barriers 
Focus groups found that participants perceived 
funding and session caps, and were concerned that 
personal financial resources were needed to 
continue services post-trial. (s5, p96). 
Overall, GPs agreed that unless the financial 
reimbursement system was simplified, care planning 
would not be as successful as it had been in the trial. 
GPs held the view that, without the extensive 
support of Service Coordinators in clarifying the 
complex administrative process, care planning would 
be unlikely to occur in future (s2, p390) 
Canada PRISMA, Programme of 
Research to Integrate Services 
for the Maintenance of 
Autonomy 








Frail people aged 65+ with moderate 
to severe impairment 
Integration model: 
Coordination of health and social care  
Single point of entry, regardless of 
provider. Case manager responsible 
for assessment, individual service 
plan, commissioning, follow up and 
reporting.  
Computerised clinical chart for sharing 
client information on the Quebec 
health and social services intranet 
[89]. PRISMA subsequently rolled out 
across Quebec [90]. 
IRM: 
Quebec’s health and social services 
were integrated [89], but “no new 
financing mechanisms” for PRISMA 
[34]. Budgets negotiated between 
partner organisations [31, 34]: a joint 
Quasi-experimental study  
4 years 
728 / 773 
Three experimental regions compared with 
three control regions in Quebec, matched 
on demographics and ‘health indicators’ 
[10, 89]. As part of Quebec, the 
comparator regions’ health and social care 
systems were integrated and managed by 
the same ministry and regional authorities.  
The PRISMA intervention was partially 
implemented in these regions.  
Participants randomly selected from each 
region, aged 75+, and “at risk of functional 
decline” [10]. People institutionalised in 
long-term care were excluded.   
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
No significant between-group difference in mortality 
or in institutionalisation.   
In the last two years of the study (when 
implementation of PRISMA was at least 70%), the 
prevalence of functional decline was significantly 
lower in the intervention group.  In the final year 
only, the incidence of functional decline was 
significantly lower in the intervention group. [34] 
Service use & costs 
No significant difference between the groups in 
change scores for admissions, length of stay or 
readmissions.  The pattern of ER visits over time was 
significantly different, with the intervention group 
having a higher rate initially [10]. 
Barriers 
Implementation slower than expected.  
Other 
The control regions had ‘usual care’ and no special 
alignment of budgets – so the study evaluates the 
whole co-ordination effort vs. usual practice, not the 
                                                          
7
 http://www.prismaquebec.ca 
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governing board, with representatives 
from all the health and social care 
organisations and community 
agencies, agreed on the resources to 
allocate to the integrated system from 
each of the organisations involved 
[90]. 
financial integration.  The comparator group also 
received integrated care and some level of the 
intervention, so was not an uncontaminated 
‘placebo’ control.  
Canada SIPA, Système de services 
intégrés pour personnes âgées 
en perte d’autonomie (system 
of integrated care for older 
persons with disabilities) 




pooled funds  
 
Described as full 
integration ([89] 
p62; [58] p. 386) 
Clients: 
Community-dwelling frail older people 
with moderate to severe impairment 
Integration model: 
Health and social care including 
prevention, some respite, 
rehabilitation, medication technical 
aids & long-term care. 
Variation on PACE [34]. 
SIPA teams were community based 
and multidisciplinary. 
IRM: 
The aim was that SIPA be funded on a 
prepayment basis, based on capitation 
with financial responsibility for the full 
range of services for a defined 
population [56].  In practice, the SIPA 
team did not receive per capita 
payments, but held a pooled budget – 
though the team was not financial 
accountable (see ‘barriers’).   
RCT (block) 
22 months 
656 / 653 
Compared SIPA with usual care over 22 
months. Powered to detect differences in 
admission to hospital / nursing home 
rather than in health outcomes [11].  
The control group had no case 
management of services “little control over 
the budget and could not pay for 
attendance in group homes.” [11] 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
No difference found in health status or mortality in 
those who received SIPA versus those receiving 
standard care.  Satisfaction higher for SIPA caregivers 
with no increase in caregiver burden or out-of-
pocket costs.  
Service use & costs 
SIPA was cost neutral, with participants incurring 
higher community care costs that were offset by the 
reduction in institutional costs. There were no 
significant differences in utilization and costs of A&E 
department, hospital acute inpatient, and nursing 
home stays.  However, the cost of nursing home care 
was significantly lower in the subgroup of frail older 
SIPA clients living alone compared with similar 
controls. 
Compared with the control group, the number of 
acute hospital patients with delayed discharges (‘bed 
blockers’) fell by 50% in the intervention group.   
 
Barriers 
Financial incentives for family physician participation 
proved insufficient, and constrained the SIPA team’s 
capacity to organise community medical care.  
Canadian publicly managed and funded system with 
global budgets meant that there were limited 
incentives to reduce inappropriate utilisation (i.e. 
SIPA staff were not financially accountable) [11]. 







Resident population of Barking and 
Dagenham (~160,000), an outer 
London borough with high levels of 
mortality and social need, but no 
hospital within the borough. 
Integration model: 
PCT established in 2001, to be 
coterminous with the local authority. 
Aim was to integrate health and social 
care management.  Joint 
Qualitative study (questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, literature review) 
investigating reasons for failure and 
learning points.  
Study duration not stated. 
N: 18 questionnaires; 16 interviews  
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not assessed 
Service use & costs 
Not assessed 
Barriers 
The reasons for failure were not to do with financial 
integration, but reflected basic incompatibilities 
(priorities, governance, language), the lack of 
national support (“No stars for integration” and NHS 
priorities were effectively “non-negotiable”), and the 
presence of significant conflicts between centrally 
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appointments included strategic posts 
(PCT Chief Executive and Director of 
Social Services; joint Director of Public 
Health and others) and others at 
operational management level.  
Similar to the model adopted in 
Knowsley (Merseyside) and Southwark 
(Inner London).   
IRM: 
Aimed for structural integration, 
covering the commissioning and 
provider functions of health and social 
care. ‘Similar to a Care Trust but not 
an NHS organisation” (p.12). The 
initiative ran from 2001-2003 when 
the new PCT received a zero star 
rating and the venture was disbanded. 
managed and locally governed services – national 
targets vs. local discretion, structure vs. culture.  
 
England Care Trusts 
[37, 83, 91-93] 
 
See also:  
 Blackburn with Darwen 
Care Trust Plus 
 NE Lincolnshire Care Trust 
Plus 
 Somerset Partnership 
Health and Social Care 
Trust 




People with health and social care 
needs. 
Integration model: 
Fully integrated: health and social care 
responsibilities combined within single 
NHS organisation.  Includes provision 
of adult health and social care and/or 
mental health or learning disability 
care – approach varies by local 
partnership ([37]; para 27). 
IRM: 
The Health Act flexibilities provide the 
essential mechanism for constructing 
Care Trusts’ constitution ([93], p 23). 
Partnership arrangements are tailored 
to local circumstances ([37], p22). 
Joint funding arrangements form part 
of the overall legal partnership 
agreement (p 27).   
From April 2013, commissioning 
responsibilities moved to local Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, and Care 
Trusts are now only responsible for 
provision. 
(from Torbay website: 
http://www.torbaycaretrust.nhs.uk/a
boutus/Pages/Default.aspx)  
Audit Commission, 2009 [37]: mixed 
methods including national survey of 
pooled funding arrangements (2008), 
workshops (2009), semi-structured 
interviews (2009), literature review and 
analysis of national expenditure, 
performance indicator and activity 
datasets. 
 
Duration: 1 year 
 
Analysis of activity data: 10 Care Trusts 
National survey: number of responding CTs 
unclear (overall response: 69% of 
organisations surveyed). 
 
The qualitative study included 3 CTs [37] 
 NE Lincolnshire Care Trust Plus 
 Solihull Care Trust 
 Torbay Care Trust 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
No evidence of improved health outcomes.  Local 
evaluations rarely assessed user outcomes or 
specified them adequately.   
Service use & costs 
No evidence of greater efficiency.   Trends in 
emergency bed days for respiratory disease, 
fractured neck of femur (which relates to falls) and 
stroke rehabilitation were similar to the PCT trend, 
not lower.  Use of Health Act flexibilities did not 
appear to make any difference to delayed transfers 
of care or to residential and nursing home 
admissions. 
Barriers 
Local relationships are a driving factor for choice of 
integration approach.  Practical difficulties to 
integration arise if Care Trust staff work under 
different pay, pension schemes or human resources 
support.   
Care Trusts have an NHS governance and 
performance management framework.  Local 
government may therefore perceive Care Trusts as a 
‘health takeover’ that undermines local 
accountability. 
“Statutory responsibilities and accountabilities of 
individual organisations .. are not removed by 
entering into arrangements for integrated 
governance, whether of the care trust form or other 
kinds of partnership” [83].  
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England Cross-charging 
[17, 37, 54, 62, 94, 95] 
Cross charging Clients: 
People of all ages and with any 
condition, who require social care 
following discharge from an acute 
hospital.  
Integration model: 
Previously implemented in Sweden 
and Denmark [62]. 
A reimbursement scheme to help 
minimise health and social care 
disputes over older people’s services 
and support “good joint working” [94]. 
The scheme did not apply to mental 
health or non-acute settings.  In 
March 2002, the DH set up a Health 
and Social Care Change Action Team 
to provide practical support. 
IRM: 
The Community Care (Delayed 
Discharges etc.) Act 2003 introduced 
an incentive system whereby councils 
were charged around £100/day if they 
were solely responsible for a patient’s 
delayed hospital discharge [37], either 
because the council failed to provide a 
timely assessment, or because of 
failure to provide social care services. 
NHS bodies had a duty to notify social 
services of inpatients’ need for 
community care and of the planned 
discharge date. For the first three 
years, the scheme was funded by the 
Delayed Discharges grant (£100m 
taken annually from the NHS budget) 
[17, 62].  
National evaluation before and after study 
by the Commission for Social Care 
Inspection (CSCI) (reported in Henwood 
2006 [17]).  
Case reports of 3 local initiatives to 
manage the new scheme [54]. 
Postal survey of 83 mental health hospitals 
(where use of cross-charging was under 
consideration) [62]. Response rate: 42% 
(35/83) 
Mixed methods study of joint financing 
arrangements (see under Care Trusts for 
details) [37]. 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Anecdotal evidence in the CSCI report that the 
scheme led to poor outcomes for patients in terms 
of “overly hasty” discharge and increased risk of 
readmission [17]. 
Service use & costs 
Evidence to suggest a downward trend in delayed 
discharges, which began prior to the implementation 
of the fines, but accelerated after the scheme’s 
introduction [17]. Southwark council put the 
discharge grant funding towards a pooled budget 
with a local hospital trust.  Monies were used to fund 
schemes to reduce avoidable admissions and 
delayed discharges: a community-based urgent care 
team; step-down housing; and extra occupational 
therapists at the Trust. There was anecdotal 
evidence of success in reducing delayed discharges 
[54]. However, only 11% PCTs used pooled funds for 
intermediate care (69% used integrated community 
equipment services (ICES)) [26]. 
Barriers 
In some areas, a shortfall of services for people with 
cognitive impairment obstructed timely discharge 
[17], and delayed transfers of care are associated 
with availability of intermediate care, rehabilitation 
services and social care to support people living 
independently at home [37]; (p48).   
Other 
Overall, the policy appeared to improve partnership 
working, although this varied locally [17].  In East 
Kent, the secondary and intermediate care teams 
were integrated.  The team assessed inpatients, 
monitored progress and supported appropriate 
discharge arrangements [54]. 
The policy may have exacerbated shortages of 
appropriate residential care for mental health 
patients (who were not subject to the cross-charging 
policy), causing delays in the non-acute sector [62] 
As Payment by Results was rolled out alongside this 
policy, the separate effect of the reimbursement 
scheme on discharges is difficult to disentangle.  
England Cumbria PCT 






Whole of local population but 
targeted at those deemed to be at risk 
of hospital admission, especially 
elderly and those with long-term 
National evaluation of Integrated Care 
Pilots by RAND Europe [15].   
Mixed methods: difference in difference 
analysis of quantitative data (HES, 
patient/user surveys and staff surveys); 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Mixed evidence on patient satisfaction (across all 
sites) with improvements reported in some aspects 
of care and deterioration in others. 
Service use & costs 





One of the 16 integrated care pilots 
funded by the English Department of 
Health. Cumbria PCT had 3 sub-pilots 
that used different approaches.  
Cockermouth: new premises 
delivering range of services, 3 GP 
practices merged to form an 
integrated care primary care practice;  
Maryport: planned a management 
takeover of GP practice, PCT staff and 
social services;  
South Lakeland: GP commissioning 
collaborative. 
IRM: 
“Budgets were devolved from the PCT 
to each of the three pilot sites to 
enable them to commission and 
provide effective integrated services 
tailored to meet the needs of the 
communities.” [15] 
cross-sectional study of cost data 
(secondary care costs examined via person 
and practice based level analysis; 
proformas at study sites; review of 
qualitative data (semi-structured “Living 
Documents” and in-depth case studies at 6 
of the pilots). N varied with each element 
of the analysis and in each pilot (e.g. in all 
16 pilots: 8,691 cases and 42,206 controls 
for secondary data analysis; 700 service 
user questionnaires).  3 year “embedded 
evaluation” undertaken whilst pilots were 
being implemented.  
The evaluation reports results across all 
pilots or sub-sets of pilots and usually not 
at the level of the individual pilot, so it is 
not possible to describe the results for the 
Cumbria pilot specifically. 
Results for group of 6 pilots that involved case 
management and were targeted at those at high risk 
of admission (including Cumbria) showed an increase 
in emergency admissions of 9%. After consideration 
of potential impact of imperfect matching, the 
evaluation concluded “..while we cannot be certain 
the pilot interventions increased emergency 
admissions, it is very unlikely that they reduced 
them” [15]; p 57.  Cumbria reported data to the 
evaluation team that suggested emergency 
admissions had been reduced in their own local 
metrics but the change began before the start of the 
pilot. In this group of 6 pilots, utilisation of elective 
admissions declined significantly (-22%), as did 
outpatient attendances (-21%).  There was an overall 
reduction in bed days used of 14%.  Across the group 
of 6 pilots, this translated to a net saving in 
secondary care costs of £223 per patient over 6 
month period. 
Evaluation collected costs of delivering the pilots and 
savings made, but the information received was not 
sufficiently comparable across sites to allow a cost-
effectiveness analysis.  
 
Barriers (specific to Cumbria) 
Funding arrangements that “leave [the] cost of 
service change with one organisation and the 
benefits with another”; HR and personnel issues; 
getting timely and accurate data; working against 
changing national policy. 
Some of the planned changes did not materialise 
during the course of the Cumbria pilot due to 
practical and legal issues 
England Darlington Pilot 








Frail older ‘mentally alert’ people 
requiring long-stay care, but wishing 
to be discharged home [96].  
Darlington was one of 28 pilots 
undertaken in the mid 1980s, and the 
only one that set limits on client 
budgets. 
Integration model: 
Service (‘specialist case’) managers 
held devolved individual budgets for 
up to 20 patients.  Responsible for 
developing and monitoring care 
Quasi-experimental trial [6] 
- Intervention group; N=101 
- Comparator (‘control’) group of long 
stay inpatients from hospital in 
adjacent district; N=113 
Assessments made at 6 months 
Control group were significantly more 
impaired (social disturbance scale), had 
significantly longer mean inpatient stays, 
and were much less likely to be terminally 
ill. The authors attempted to adjust for 
these factors by excluding participants with 
terminal illness (or who died) and using 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Significantly greater improvements in satisfaction, 
morale and depression in the intervention group.  No 
evidence of greater stress on carers [6].  
Service use & costs 
The main cost was home care assistant time. Total 
costs of care were slightly lower in the intervention 
group. Patterns of institutional use in the two groups 
were very different, with most people in the control 
group remaining in long-stay hospital throughout the 
study period.  
Barriers 
Not reported. 
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packages, providing emotional advice 
and information and co-ordinating 
services. Home care assistants, who 
worked in teams provided domiciliary 
care and some care usually provided 
by district nurses [97]; p. 67.  
IRM: 
Devolved budget for health and social 
care, equivalent to 67% of the cost of 
institutional care (long-stay hospital 
bed).  Shadow prices for statutory 
services, with capacity to pay for 
voluntary services (ibid; p127). 
covariance analysis to deal with the 
imbalance in impairment. 
Carers were also interviewed. They 
included carers of people in the 
intervention group; for the control group, 
they comprised carers of people in long-
stay hospital in the control area and carers 
of people attending day hospital.  
Other 
There were important clinical differences between 
the groups at baseline, so the interpretation of the 
findings is uncertain. Care quality was found to be 
higher in the intervention group.  
England Hertfordshire Integrated 
specialist mental health service 






Adults and children with mental 
health problems, learning disability or 
using drug and alcohol services.  
Integration model: 
Provision of specialist, integrated 
mental health services by 
Hertfordshire Partnership Trust (est. 
2001). Services reconfigured to 
include specialist teams additional to 
the (more traditional) generalist 
Community Mental Health Teams 
(CMHTs). 
IRM: 
Pooled commissioning budget used 
for joint commissioning of services for 
the whole county by Hertfordshire 
County Council and its NHS partners, 8 
PCTs.  In 2002/3, the total pooled 
budget was £160m [67].    
Evaluation focused on the effects of the 
provision of specialist mental health 
services and used mixed methods [66]:  
 User and carer focus groups (2004); 
31 participants in 4 focus groups 
 semi-structured interviews with 
specialist and generalist Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT) 
managers (2004); 31 participants 
 postal survey of CMHT staff (2002; 
[response rate 54%] and 2004 [38%] 
to identify job satisfaction and role 
clarity before and after the 
introduction of specialist services 
The evaluation was of the provision of 
services, rather than on the role of 
integrated funding per se.  
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not reported.  
Service use & costs 
Not reported.  
Barriers 
Reconfiguration of services did not ease the burden 
on CMHTs, as specialist teams typically focused on 
previously excluded client groups, rather than on 
existing case loads.  
Other 
Users and carers were mainly positive about the 
specialist integrated teams, finding them sensitive, 
supportive and responsive.   
For staff, job satisfaction and role clarity scores 
showed moderate to good levels of achievement, 
including perceived team effectiveness associated 
with the new service.  Little change over time, but 
wide geographical variation across Hertfordshire.  
For complex cases, it was difficult to provide 
continuity of care and client and carer wishes 
sometimes involved a trade off. 
All participants recognised that inpatient admission 
could be the best option for some users at certain 
times (a “sanctuary”, p. 413). 








People with diabetes (15,000); people 
aged 75+ (22,000). These groups 
represent 10% of the population and 
consume almost 30% of the 
healthcare budget in North West 
London [73].  
Aims: 
To improve outcomes, improve access 
Evaluation of Year 1: 09/11 to 07/12.   
Quasi experimental, using mixed methods 
across 4 Work Programmes (WPs) 
WP 1 Strategic evaluation of the pilot in 
the context of national policy [64]. 
WP 2 Measuring service usage patterns for 
secondary and social care, using a 
propensity matched case control model. In 
year 1, 1236 intervention patients had 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Process measures only.  There were significant 
increases in the use of dementia screening (for care 
plans in over 75s), the number of people diagnosed 
with dementia and the number of care plans 
provided [77, 78].  
Diabetes testing increased, but no significant 
improvement in disease control (Hb1A1c or blood 
pressure). 
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to integrated care, reduce 
unnecessary admissions, and enable 
joint working (historically, 
relationships were “tense”) [64], p22). 
GPs had to aim to reduce one 
unplanned admission per client group 
each month (p22), equivalent to 7 
avoided admissions per 2000 pilot 
population [70], p219),  and so reduce 
total health and social care spending 
by 24% over 5 years (ibid). 
8
    
Integration model: 
Integration of providers, rather than 
commissioning functions [64]. Pilot 
involved 100 GP practices, 2 acute and 
2 MH trusts, 3 community care 
providers, 5 social care providers and 
2 voluntary organisations [73].  Pilot 
overseen by an Integrated 
Management Board.  Proactive care 
planning across care settings by 
doctor-led multidisciplinary teams 
(MDGs), targeted at high-risk 
individuals with complex needs; care 
delivered by community teams; use of 
risk stratification tool (CPM: Combined 
Predictive Model) [73], and data 
sharing systems; aligned incentive 
structure. The tool assesses patients’ 
risk and need for intensive care 
management; documents individuals’ 
health (primary and secondary, 
mental and acute) and social care use; 
and enables the care plan to be shared 
across settings [74](p6).  
IRM: 
£5.7m upfront investment, funded 
from (a) difference between tariff and 
payment for ‘over performance’ on 
emergency admissions (capped at 
2008/9 levels); (b) reduced payments 
for emergency readmissions 
[72](pp32, 34).  Figure later revised to 
matched controls [77]. 
WP 3  
Using a mixture of clinical process and 
outcome measures to observe service 
quality, both in primary and secondary 
care. Patient-level data on primary, 
secondary and social care were available 
for the pilot patients, but only practice-
level (QOF) data were available for the 
comparator group [75](pp 6, 20).  
WP 4 A mixed methods approach to 
capture professional and patient 
experience of the integrated care process, 
using non-participant observations of 
multidisciplinary meetings, patient case 
conferences and operational meetings; 
focus groups with patients and 
professionals; semi-structured interviews 
with patients and professionals; survey 
with main stakeholders [76, 78].  
Most patients were unaware they were enrolled in 
the ICP. Some reported improved access, but only 
13% had a copy of their care plan. GPs felt pressured 
to produce care plans, and there was concern over 
plans’ quality [64].   
Service use & costs 
Results of the first year evaluation found no 
significant reduction in emergency admissions, A&E 
attendances, the hospital cost of emergencies or 
total hospital cost [74](p9); [78].  No significant 
change in the rate of admissions for falls and 
fractures [74](p7). 
Barriers 
The IT tool lacked the ‘interoperability and 
functionality’ desired by healthcare professionals. 
However, it enabled the (previously impossible) 
tracking of health and social care use. 
The use of incentives (or even the “symbolism of the 
savings arrangements” [64], p 20) was considered 
critical to successful engagement of local providers 
(i.e. allaying fears and engendering trust), and 
important for reducing “inherent tensions in the 
system created by the purchaser-provider split and 
payment by results.” [64](p 19).  However, risk 
sharing by primary care was recognised to be 
“difficult” [64](p20).   
Only acute trusts were penalised under PbR for 
readmissions or emergency admissions [64, 78].   
The MDG meetings were intended to be forums for 
identifying ways to improve efficiency in the local 
health economy by use of innovative out-of-hospital 
services.  In practice, discussions were dominated by 
GPs and consultants and only 39% of the Innovation 
Fund was spent in the first year [78].   
                                                          
8
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46  CHE Research Paper 97 
 
£10m [78].  
No integration across commissioners, 
but use of financial incentives.  
Reinvestment payment contingent 
upon: 
 quality of patient care 
maintained or improved. 
 net reduction in the cost of 
emergency care across the pilot 
Reinvestment payment shared 
between partner organisations in the 
MDGs: GPs (40%); acute providers 
(30%); community health providers 
(15%); local authority and mental 
health providers (7.5%). They must be 
spent on healthcare services 
[72](p39).  
A “resource envelope” of £40 
(diabetes) or £80 (older person) per 
person held by MDG to support 
reduction in emergency care 
[72](p32).  Resources can be spent on 
care planning, MDG meeting 
attendance, care co-ordination and 
better out-of-hospital care (a 
“contingency pot” for pump priming 
new service developments [70](p223) 
also known as the “Innovation Fund” 
[64]( p27).  
England Oxfordshire pooled budgets/ 
lead commissioning 
[37, 98] 




Older people and adults with a 
physical disability. 
Adults with mental health problems.  
Integration model: 
Health and social care (continuing 
care) 
IRM: 
Lead commissioning by the county 
council, who held the pooled budget. 
Significant effort to identify which 
funds to pool: PCT top-sliced 
continuing care / RNCC (registered 
nurse care contribution) budgets; 
council pooled a proportion of the 
home support budget. Joint financing 
Description from ex-service manager at 
Oxfordshire CC [98] 
Survey of pooled funding arrangements 
[37]. See Pooled budgets.  
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not assessed. Roberts 2006 reports that users and 
clients perceived the services to be more 
streamlined [98].  
Service use & costs 
Streamlined payment service, reducing costs and 
bureaucracy; improved residential and nursing care 
purchasing; increased capacity for long-term 
placements; broader range of beds purchased (e.g. 
intermediate care, respite beds etc).   





The Single Assessment Process led to fewer disputes 
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for continuing care enabled a single 
assessment process for end-of-life 
care.  
In 2006, Oxfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire NHS Trust and 2 
county councils used the flexibilities to 
develop integrated approach for 
adults with MH problems.  
Performance (including financial 
performance) assessed on balanced 
scorecard. 
and tensions between health and social care 
partners [37].  Good IT infrastructure essential to 
support and manage budget and assess 
performance. Flexibilities helped deliver ‘coherent’ 
commissioning ([98]; p. 44) . 
England Pilot of Partnerships for Older 
People Projects 
POPP 
[4, 14, 60, 99, 100] 






29 Local Authority led sites running 
146 projects.  Aimed at creating a 
sustainable shift in resources & 
culture away from institutional & 
hospital-based crisis care for older 
people towards earlier, targeted 
interventions within community 
settings.  Overall, older people as 
volunteers provided almost half of the 
staffing.  
Integration model: 
Focus was on prevention and early 
intervention.  Reducing social 
exclusion/promoting healthy living 
central to two-thirds of projects 
(community facing); avoiding hospital 
admission/facilitating early discharge 
central to one-third (hospital facing).   
Projects varied in the type of needs 
they aimed to address:  
1. primary prevention: low level 
wellbeing services to encourage 
independent living,  such as 
gardening clubs, exercise, 
befriending (49 projects 
accounting for 31% of total POPP 
spend) 
2. secondary prevention: higher 
level services for people at risk 
of admission, such as carer 
support, medicines 
management, falls prevention 
and follow-up (40 projects 
accounting for 24% of spend) 
Local evaluations at each site and a 
national evaluation [4].  Retrospective 
analysis of a sub-set of 8 projects was 
subsequently undertaken [14, 60].  
National evaluation was a multi-method 
(15 methods of data collection and 
analysis), 3 phased approach to explore 3 
key issues:  outcomes; impact on joint 
working and resource use.  Involved 
quantitative analysis, documentary 
analysis, focus groups, interviews, 
questionnaires – some across all sites, 
others with a sample only.  A set of core 
data was collected from all sites: financial 
and activity data; QoL questionnaires [EQ-
5D plus question on overall perception of 
change in QoL to sample of 1,529]; details 
from the Public Service Agreements for 
long‐term conditions and for Older 
Persons. 
Attempts at robust (controlled) 
comparisons were made, although the 
breadth and nature of interventions and 
the study population (elderly) presented 
substantial methodological challenges. 
Substantial efforts were made to analyse 
results in terms of types of project (see 
‘description’) but the nature of the 
intervention meant it was not possible to 
provide a micro-level analysis of what 
specific type of projects, managed in a 
particular way, would provide better and 
more cost-effective outcomes.  
Health Related QoL: standardised 
questionnaire administered before and 3 
It is not possible to attribute the general findings 
from the programme evaluation solely to the use of 
financial integration mechanism. 
 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
- 75% of “key informant” survey respondents 
thought POPP had led to improved outcomes 
e.g., improved QoL for older people; better 
access, greater range of services.   
- Health Related QoL:  Compared to control, 
POPP users generally experienced slight 
improvements in HRQoL, although this varied 
by type of project.  Largest improvements 
were in those using tertiary services and those 
receiving practical help in the community.  
The single QoL rating showed some 
deterioration in perceived QoL after the 
intervention.  All results have to be treated 
with caution due to nature of sample and the 
relatively short duration of interventions.     
- Small increase in take up of benefits. 
Service use & costs 
- Before and after comparison using PCTs with 
no POPP projects as a control group within a 
DiD analysis, suggests statistically significant 
reduction in emergency bed day use: for every 
£1 spent on POPP, savings ranged from £0.80 
to £1.60 in bed days saved, with the biggest 
effect seen in larger projects and in 
secondary/tertiary projects. 
- Before and after comparison based on 
questionnaires suggested reductions in 
hospital overnights stays (47%), use of A&E 
services (29%) and physiotherapy/OT and 
outpatient appointments. 
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3. tertiary prevention: services for 
those at serious risk of imminent 
admission, such as rapid 
response teams, hospital at 
home, case management (35 
projects accounting for 35% of 
spend) 
4. underpinning projects: 
supported development of 
initiatives such as staff and carer 
training programmes, 
accreditation schemes (22 
projects accounting for 10% of 
spend).   
Projects were also categorised into 
types: e.g., practical help to enhance 
wellbeing, enhancement of physical 
health, information and signposting 
services, case finding, specialist falls, 
long-term conditions. 
The 8 projects included in the 
retrospective evaluation [60] 
comprised four interventions selected 
as they had potential to reduce 
emergency admissions (support 
workers alongside community 
matrons; post-discharge scheme; 
multi-dimensional integrated H&SC 
teams; out of hours response 
scheme), and four fell into the 
“prevention” category (category 1 
above) and were lower level 
interventions aimed at short term 
assessment and signposting.  
IRM: 
£60m in POPP funding provided to the 
partnerships for provision of services; 
however, integrated financing was not 
the key focus of the programme and 
the projects varied enormously in 
terms of the degree and type of 
financial integration pursued.  It is not 
clear whether the schemes in the 
retrospective analysis involved IRMs 
or not [14, 60].  
A range of financial levers were 
months after POPP intervention. “Quasi-
control” sample drawn from BHPS to 
control for expected declines in QoL 
amongst older population.  
 
A sub-set of 8 programmes with the 
potential to  avoid unplanned admissions 
were analysed retrospectively using a 
person-based approach and prognostically 
matched controls, avoiding some of the 
methodological challenges of the national 
aggregate level evaluation outlined above 
[60].  A group of 14,100 people used the 8 
POPP interventions and an attempt was 
made to match them all to the controls 
drawn from similar areas across England, 
but where the POPP intervention had not 
taken place, using pseudonymous data 
linked to HES hospital utilisation data.  The 
focus of the analysis was on the use of 
hospital resources, mainly in terms of 
emergency admissions and bed-days. 
Utilisation was tracked between 6-9 
months post-intervention, varying by POPP 
intervention.  
Additional analyses presented Difference 
in Difference regression results for 2 of the 
schemes (post-discharge intermediate care 
and the H&SC integrated teams) [14]. 
- The combined project and service use costs 
were analysed with the HRQoL results for the 
POPP and the control group and analysed 
using a Cost Effectiveness Acceptability Curve 
to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the POPP 
compared with usual care (no POPP).  The 
probability that the overarching POPP 
programme is cost-effective compared with 
usual care was 86% at the £30,000 per QALY 
level; falling to 74% at the £20,000 level.     
- The estimates of the probability of cost-
effectiveness vary across type of projects and 
are especially high for tertiary prevention, 
although sample numbers are small.  The 
more robust, retrospective analysis of 8 
selected interventions found no evidence of a 
reduction in emergency admissions and in 
some instances there were more admissions 
in the intervention group than in the control 
group. In one site emergency bed-days were 
reduced, while in another the intervention 
group had more bed-days than the control 
group. “Overall we found that the POPP 
interventions we studied did not appear to 
have reduced use of acute hospitals. 
However, there were signs that one of the 
interventions reduced emergency hospital 
admissions for a high-risk subgroup” [60]; p. 
30.   
- The latter intervention was the integrated 
health and social care teams configured 
around primary care teams, which focused on 
people with one or more long-term conditions 
and the result may thus suggest that some 
integrated H&SC schemes have potential to 
reduce hospital resource use for some sub-
groups.  However, there is no mention of use 
of a specific IRM in the scheme studied so it is 
not possible to attribute the outcome to an 
IRM specifically.    
Barriers 
- Practical and ethical issues in sharing 
electronic data between organisations 
- Tension between competition and co-
operation, especially for projects 
straddling primary / secondary care 
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employed across the pilot sites to 
facilitate partnerships and improve 
integration, including:  
 the financial flexibilities 
introduced in the Health Act 
(1999), used by 5 of the 29 sites 
9
 
 Practice-based commissioning 
and delegated budgets;  
 Payment by results (whereby 
savings from acute care can be 
made available for community 
care).  
- staff recruitment and retention – due to 
short duration of projects 
- geographical reconfiguration of 
organisations during project period (PCT 
boundaries altered) 
- Translating cost reductions into an actual 
cost saving usually impossible, due to 
difficulties in transferring funds across 
care boundaries. Where it was feasible, 
this was due to prior agreements at 
senior level. Preventive based projects 
were expecting to be able to utilise 
savings from reduced emergency bed 
days in order to sustain their programmes 
in the longer term but these system wide 
transfers did not take place. 
England Pooled budgets 
[37, 93, 101] 
 
See also: 
 Oxfordshire pooled 
budgets  
 North East Lincolnshire 
Care Trust Plus 
Pooled funds Clients: 
Pooled funds are mainly used for 
learning disability, community 
equipment and mental health 
services, but rarely for older people’s 
services [37]. In 2008, total pooled 
expenditure was £3.4bn (p13). 
Integration model: 
Varies, depending on application. For 
learning disability, councils were most 
likely to host the fund, whereas for 
mental health the PCT or MH Trust 
was the likely host. For community 
equipment, pooled funds were 
mandatory and usually hosted by the 
PCT [37]; p19. Pooled budgets are also 
mandatory for intermediate care 
funds, although only 11% of PCTs had 
these (ibid, p19).  
IRM: 
Resources are pooled by partner 
organisations; staff can then spend 
the pooled budget across a spectrum 
of health and social care resources 
[93]; p24.   
The most frequently used of the three 
Health Act flexibilities [102]. Can aid 
Qualitative evaluation of first 32 localities 
to use the flexibilities [93, 101].   
 Postal survey: at baseline and at 
18 mths; N=32 
 case studies of 10 partnerships 
 In depth case studies of 3 
partnerships, with stakeholder 
interviews  
Mixed methods used by Audit 
Commission‘s national evaluation [37] – 
see under Care Trusts. 
Audit Commission pooled fund survey 
(2008) of auditors at all PCTs and councils 
in England. Responses covered 69% of all 
organisations.  
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Can be used to protect services for vulnerable groups 
[37]. However, ‘regular, systematic monitoring of 
outcomes against plan’ was rare (p 39).  Two-thirds 
of users were satisfied with integrated community 
equipment services (ICES), which is typically 
facilitated by pooled funds (p45). 
Service use & costs 
Areas with joint financing arrangements had slightly 
lower lengths of stay for mental health, though not 
statistically significant [37]; (p44). 
Analysis of national data found use of pooled 
budgets had little impact on per capita spend on 
mental health (p18), no impact on emergency bed 
days when used for intermediate care (p 45), and no 
significant effect on delayed transfers of care or on 
nursing home admissions (p63).   
Barriers 
Clear legal and financial frameworks were essential 
for defining responsibilities on commissioning, 
provision, monitoring, and data sharing.  Obstacles 
included different accounting and audit 
requirements, VAT regimens, the valuation of 
infrastructure relating to pooled resources, and what 
proportion of new monies should be added to the 
pooled budget.  Pooled budgets were effectively 
‘ring fenced’, reducing partners’ capacity to manage 
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transparency and clarify 
responsibilities within the partnership 
[37]; p28.  
deficits in other parts of the system [93]; (p28). 
There were technical incompatibilities between the 
NHS and local government IT systems, and concerns 
about confidentiality and data governance (ibid, 
p30).  There were similar incompatibilities between 
the national performance and audit systems (p31).  
England Somerset Partnership Health 
and Social Care Trust 





People with mental health problems. 
Somerset had population of 
approximately 470,000 and history of 
joint working (this was the first Care 
Trust to be established in England 
[109]). 
Integration model: 
Prototype for subsequent care trusts. 
Combined provision, integrating 
mental health & social care, including 
co-location.  Around 120 social care 
staff transferred to NHS Trust [69]; p. 
41. 
IRM: 
Joint commissioning through the Joint 
Commissioning Board (JCB). Budgets 
not pooled but aligned (“parallel”). 
Before and after study, one and two years 
post implementation (1999 – 2001). 
Structured interviews (service users), semi-
structured interviews (managers), focus 
groups (service users and carers), staff 
surveys, workshops, non-participant based 
observation of Joint Commissioning Board 
meetings. 
96 service users completed a range of 
questionnaires including Lancashire Quality 
of Life Questionnaire, Camberwell 
Assessment of Need scale, Verona Service 
Satisfaction Scale. 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
The Partnership failed to produce significant benefits 
[107].   
Service users reported improvements in self-
reported mental health status.  Some service users 
reported engagement with service increased their 
independence.   
Service use & costs 
Restructuring did not adversely affect the quality of 
care (p6) and the board consistently provided “good 
financial settlements” for mental health services 
[65]; (p37).  
Barriers 
Service users were concerned that there remained 
no alternative to hospital admission in times of crisis 
[107].  Evaluation of process measures suggested 
that restructuring was associated with short-term 
reductions in staff job satisfaction, morale & role 
clarity [69] (p. 44). 
England Torbay Care Trust 
[From April 2012: Torbay and 
Southern Devon Health and 
Care NHS Trust] 





Population of 140,000, with high 
proportion of older people.   
ICP pilot focuses on older people with 
complex co-morbidities.  
Integration model: 
Care Trust est. 2005 
Five H&SC teams based in localities, 
aligned with GP practices. Single 
access point and assessment, with 
pooled budget, and adult social 
services and PCT functions shared 
[116].  Shared health and social care 
electronic record [110]. 
Intermediate care services provided 
within each locality (occupational 
therapists, social workers, 
physiotherapists, district nurses).  
Integrated Care Pilot focused on 
improving discharge arrangements for 
older people. Explored pooled budgets 
Ham 2010 [110, 111] reports some 
comparative statistics, but the 
methodology is not described.  
 
Some strands of work were evaluated by 
RAND as part of the national ICP evaluation 
[15].  See Cumbria entry for methodology.  
In Torbay, the analysis of secondary care 
utilisation was based on practice (not 
individual) level data. 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Results from the ICP evaluation provided mixed 
findings for patient satisfaction (across all sites in the 
national evaluation) with improvements reported in 
some aspects of care and deterioration in others. 
Service use & costs 
“Measurable progress in reducing reliance on acute 
hospitals and avoiding admissions” [110]: 
- Reduction in acute and community hospital 
bed occupancy rates (from 1998/99 to 2008/9);  
- rate of emergency bed days lower than 
regional average 
- using only 47% of emergency bed days for 
people experiencing two or more admissions 
for its benchmark group of people aged 85 and 
over 
The methodology for these statistics [111] is not 
reported, so the attribution of these effects to the 
Care Trust model is unclear. 
Compared with the regional average, twice as many 
people aged 65+ receive a social care package and 
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across four providers: the Care Trust; S 
Devon Healthcare NHS Foundation 
Trust; mental health and local 
authority services [110].  
Part of national ICP study: the pilot 
included multiple works streams 
involving diverse range of services 
targeted at older people.  
IRM: 
Structural integration, including 
pooled budgets – teams can use these 
to commission tailored services for 
clients.  
In the national ICP evaluation, budgets 
“were not pooled but they have 
attempted to utilise primary care 
resources in secondary care settings 
and vice versa.” ([51], appendix G) 
home care provision also increased [114].   
Work streams included in the national ICP were 
evaluated separately from other pilot sites because 
patients were identified as being “enrolled” in the 
pilot only after admission to hospital. Significant 
reductions in emergency admissions (-7%); elective 
admissions (-7%) and outpatient attendance (-10%) 
were reported. These could not be attributed solely 
to the specific elements of the ICP because the 
reductions were most evident in children and young 
people rather than in the target population of the 
ICP (elderly). 
The local evaluation of Torbay’s ICP [51], (appendix 
F) compared Torbay with a neighbouring area and 
concluded that the rise in emergency admissions 
overall were lower in Torbay over a 3 year period.  
Reported reductions in average LoS for older people 
were greater in Torbay (8.6 to 7.6 days) than in the 
comparator area (8.4 to 7.8 days). Although the 
comparisons were imperfect, the national evaluation 
team concluded that they supported the general 
thrust of reduced secondary care utilisation. 
Barriers 
Reportedly more difficult to implement joint 
management than joint working by front-line staff. 
Role of direct payments and individual budgets 
perceived as a potential threat to financial 
integration [116].  
Engagement by clinicians required effort. 
England Wye Valley NHS Trust 
(Herefordshire) 




Population of 178,000, of which older 
people account for 20%.  History of 
partnership working between PCT and 
council.  Wye Valley Trust established 
April 2011 to provide integrated acute, 
community and adult social care [52]. 
Integration model: 
In 2004, used pooled funds and lead 
commissioning for an integrated 
community equipment services (ICES) 
store [37].  
In 2011, a formal integrated structure 
joined hospital services from Hereford 
Hospitals NHS Trust, community 
health services previously provided by 
NHS Herefordshire, and adult social 
See under Care Trusts for Audit 
Commission methodology [37] 
Two press releases by the Trust reported 
efficiency savings [52, 118] 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
User satisfaction with the ICES experience was above 
the national average and improved quality of life 
[37].However, the contribution of pooled finances 
(rather than the scheme’s working) to these 
outcomes was not clear.  
Service use & costs 
Reported savings in management costs from the ICES 
fund [37].  
Press releases reported the new Trust had achieved 
a reduction in delayed discharges, and cost savings 
of £440,000 (due to 1,100 bed days saved) [52]. 
These figures were for the period April 2010 to May 
2011.   
Barriers 
Not reported 
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care from Herefordshire Council. Local 
‘neighbourhood teams’ and 
intermediate care services provided at 
home or in community settings used 
to relieve pressure on acute beds. 
Multidisciplinary teams of therapists, 
nurses, social workers, along with GPs 
and practice staff.  
IRM: 
Use of flexibilities under s.75 of the 
2006 NHS Act. Joint management 
team, with pooled budgets for 
learning disabilities, adaptations, 
mental health and continuing care.
10
   
In November 2011, a joint venture 
company between the partners was 






Integrated Health & Social 
Services Boards 




Each community health and social 
services trust provided services for 
their local population. This included 
family and child care, older people, 
mental health, learning disability, 
physical disability, health promotion, 
primary and adult community health 
care. 
Integration model: 
Health and social services formally 
integrated since 1973 in response to a 
failure of local government. 
At the time of the study, there was a 2 
tier structure of 4 health and social 
service boards and 19 trusts (11 
community health and social services 
trusts; 7 acute trusts; 1 ambulance 
trust). See note on new structure 
under ’Key Findings’. 
Community trusts were responsible 
for service delivery, which they 
managed via 9 ‘programmes of care’: 
Qualitative exploratory evaluation [119]. 
Semi-structured interviews (N= 24) with 
senior managers from: 
- 4 health and social services boards (4 
interviews with directors of social 
services) 
- 11 community health and social 
services trusts (20 interviews; 3 with 
Trust Chief Executives, 17 with 
directors/ assistant directors) 
Focus groups (N=3) with 16 team leaders in 
integrated programmes of care 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not evaluated 
Service use & costs 
Integrated health and social care budgets thought to 
facilitate shift of resources from hospitals into the 
community. 
Barriers 
Despite three decades of structural integration, 
‘perennial tensions’ between the medical and social 
models of care persisted, as did professional 
rivalries.   Social care appeared more vulnerable to 
cuts than health care, and the study found several 
examples where significant sums of money (>£1m) 
had been diverted from community budgets into the 
acute sector [119](p60).  
Other 
Integrated health and social care budgets thought to 
facilitate long-term strategic planning, and flexible, 
high quality and client-centred care; and to 
discourage cost shifting and duplication of services. 
 
Note: A Review of Public Administration in 2005 
recommended major reform.  In April 2007, five 
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1. acute services 
2. maternity and child health 
3. family and child care 
4. older people 
5. mental health 
6. learning disability 
7. physical and sensory disability 
8. health promotion 
9. primary health and adult 
community 
Programme leaders assigned a key 
worker (case manager) to each 
individual; the case manager 
developed the package of care and 
regularly reviewed care needs.   
IRM: 
Structural integration: community 
health and social services trusts held 
their own budgets, determined how 
services were delivered, and were 
“managerially independent” (p53) of 
the HSS boards. The Boards undertook 
needs assessments, set priorities, 
commissioned services and monitored 
provision. 
Health and Social Care Trusts were established.  In 
April 2009, a single Health and Social Care Board, 5 
Local Commissioning Groups (coterminous with the 
Trusts) and the Public Health Agency were set up.
12
 
Scotland Community Health Partnerships 
(CHPs) / Community health and 
care partnerships (CHCPs) 
[48, 109, 121, 122] 
Aligned budgets Clients: 
Whole population in principle, but 
often targeted to groups such as older 
people. 
Integration model: 
Scotland has a history of partnership 
working, dating back to the 1990s 
[109](p. 393).  CHPs are decentralised 
but integrated health and social care 
system, covering primary health care 
from a Local Health Board, and social 
services from one or more Local 
Authorities or voluntary organisations. 
Many CHPs coterminous with Local 
Authority boundaries.  Public 
engagement via Public Partnership For 
a [109].  CHCPs set up in Glasgow and 
East Renfrewshire, bringing social 
Evaluation of three (anonymous) CHPs in 
central Scotland [109]. 
Process evaluation: interviews with 30 
stakeholders, used to develop a 
questionnaire on expected outcomes of 
successful partnership working.  
Questionnaire survey, soliciting opinions 
on CHP progress against a range of process 
and outcome measures. 
Responses (85%) from 51 individuals 
(clinicians, managers or lay people) 
associated with the CHP. Focus of 
evaluation is to test feasibility of outcome 
measures [109].  
Respondents reported subjective 
assessments of progress against a range of 
outcome measures; scores could range 
from 0 to 18, with a score < 7 designated 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
CHP performance on reducing health inequalities 
and improving health / reducing death in 
preventable diseases was ranked as ‘low’ by 
respondents in all three CHPs.   
Service use & costs 
Respondents in all 3 CHPs ranked performance as 
‘low’ with regard to: minimising delayed discharges; 
improving the quality of care packages; and 
rationalising single access points.  
Performance on reducing waiting times and 
avoidable hospital visits/admissions was ranked as 
medium (1 CHP) or low (2CHPs).  
Barriers 
Alignment and pooling of budgets identified as ‘the 
weakest area for all of the partnerships’.  The 
authors suggest ‘that this is possibly the most 
controversial and difficult area of partnership 
                                                          
12
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work services within the same 
organisation as health [48]. 
IRM: 
Varies but includes contributions from 
NHS and council to cover some 
services e.g., in East Renfrewshire: 
joint appointment for CHCP, with 
aligned budgets from NHS and council 
to cover social services, community 
and school nursing, health visiting, 
addiction clinics and community 




In Glasgow, the CHCP was dissolved due to 
disagreement over financial contributions (amongst 
other concerns) [48, 121]  
The evaluation took place one year after the CHCPs 
were set up, which helps explain why ratings were 
low.  
Scotland Evaluation of Integrated 





Varied by test site 
Integration model: 
Test sites could develop their own 
approaches across health and social 
care 
IRM: 
Each test site received £400k for 
organisational development, project 
management and staff time to 
implement mechanisms that would 
facilitate mapping work (cost/activity 
data across health and social care) and 
resource realignment. 
None implemented by the end of the 
study period. One test site introduced 
a lead agency model one month after 
study completion.  
April 2010 to March 2012, 3 phases and 
mixed methods (s. 1.6) 
 review of IRF documentation in test 
sites;  
 review of processes and discussions 
at IRF Project Team and Programme 
Board meetings;  
 interviews with key strategic 
partners;  
 email survey of delivery staff at each 
test site (summer 2010 [4 sites, n 
NS/Spring 2012 [3 sites, n=44]; 
 focus groups with operational 
(patient and client facing) staff 
An evaluation of the process to prepare for 
IRM: 
“None of the test sites were actively 
running new integrated financial and 
governance arrangements by the time of 
the final evaluation in March 2012” (s 5.2) 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
None identified 
Service use & costs 
Anecdotal evidence from survey 
Where integrated working led to more efficient use 
of resources, this did not lead to cost savings or 
resource realignment (s.8.5). 
Barriers 
Interviewees viewed some healthcare resources as 
‘fixed’ costs (e.g. beds, ward staff, wards, day care 
centres s. 5.22, 5.23), which limited scope for shifting 
resources. 
Health and social care used different accounting 
systems (e.g. overhead allocation), which made 
resource transfers complex.  
Other 
Delivery staff were less confident at the end of the 
study period than they had been at baseline that the 
integration agenda would improve patient /client 
care (5.29). 
Sweden The Norrtalje Model 






The new organisation took 
responsibility for clients who the 
municipality had previously provided 
and funded long term care: older 
people, those with chronic conditions 
and those with disabilities or mental 
illness.   
Integration model: 
Established in 2005, there were three 
components to the integrated 
structure:  
1. a single service organisation 
Longitudinal case study using documentary 
analysis and semi-structured interviews in 
spring 2008 and autumn 2009. 
Interviews: N=13 to 17 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not evaluated 
Service use & costs 
Not evaluated 
Barriers 
Access to client/ patient records by health/social 
care personnel was restricted by law, obstructing 
development of a shared record system. The existing 
county (health) financing and activity system did not 
permit recording of processes.  
Other 
A change in legislation (2004) facilitated a joint 
board.  The new financing, human resources and 
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(“Tio-Hundra AB”) managed all 
health and social care for the 
population.  
2. A governing board with 12 local 
politicians (6 from the 
municipality, which had 
previously managed social care; 
6 from the county, which had 
managed health care).   
3. A financing body (see below) 
IRM: 
A single organisation (“TioHundra 
Forvaltningen”) executed board policy, 
and administered pooled budgets for 
all health and social care as well as 
welfare payments (this budget was 
not pooled).  This body also collected 
payments and paid providers. 
Finances were structured around 3 
age groups (0-18; 18-64; 65+) and 
further divided into care (client) 
groups. 
information systems followed preparation, planning 
and a new management structure.  New clinical 
processes were then added. From 2009, 
management, financing and information were  based 
on care groups 
There was a history of good joint working.  
Sweden Pooled budgets 
[5, 101, 124, 125] 
Pooled budgets Clients: 
People aged 16-64 with a new episode 
of musculoskeletal disorder (2
nd
 
largest group of primary care users) 
[124]. 
Integration model: 
Weekly multidisciplinary team 
meetings to assess eligibility of 
patients for rehabilitation. Team 
included staff from health centres, 
social services and social insurance 
authorities, and occupational 
therapists and physiotherapists. Social 
insurance officers were co-located 
with health centre staff [124].   
IRM: 
Underpinned by legislation ‘Socsam’ 
(1994), which was trialled for 7 years 
before becoming permanent in 2003. 
Aimed to explore opportunities for 
joint financing and management 
across agencies boundaries.  
Nationally, 8 projects targets at a 
range of client groups using Socsam 
Peer-reviewed evidence available for one 
of the 8 projects (DELTA, 1997).  
Quasi-experimental study with control 
practices matched by catchment 
population (working age adults), sickness 
rate (sickness days/ number on sick leave) 
and proportion of immigrants.  
7 health centres with 138 patients 
providing data for 3 assessments [125] 
 3 health centres (128 patients) 
received the intervention (pooled 
funds, multidisciplinary assessment) 
 4 matched control health centres (39 
patients )(no pooled funds, no 
multidisciplinary assessment)  
Qualitative study to establish staff 
experience [125]:  
 9 focus groups (7 health centres + 2 
rehabilitation units) 
 Interviews with ‘unit leaders ‘(N 
unclear) 
Quantitative analysis of patient outcomes: 
patient interviews at 0, 6 and 12 months 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
No significant difference in change in quality of life 
(EQ5D) or occupational functioning (COPM) between 
the groups at 1 year follow up.  
Service use & costs 
No clear evidence of a reduction in social insurance 
expenditure on people with long-term illness. 
Intervention costs not assessed. [101];(p538).  
Barriers 
Although co-financing was thought to be necessary 
for improved interdisciplinary collaboration, its 
impact was unclear [125]. 
Other 
Staff in the intervention centres felt that 
collaboration with social insurance personnel had 
improved, but relationships with social workers 
remained “weak”.  In the control centres, external 
collaboration was “poor”. [125]. However, Socsam 
was voluntary and was implemented in organisations 
committed to participation [101]; (p538).  
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were evaluated.  
Pooled funds for primary care, social 
care and welfare payments. 
[5]:  
 Demographics and clinical 
characteristics 
 Physical activity, pain, Canadian 
Occupational Performance Measure 
(COPM), EQ5D 
Multiple linear regression, adjusting for 
baseline differences between the groups 
(age, gender and socioeconomic status).  







People with significant physical and 
developmental impairments, screened 
for clinical and financial eligibility by 
nurses / social workers employed 
directly by state (independent of 
managed care organisation (MCO)). 
Integration model: 
State-level system.  Health and social 
care services; type of managed care, 
using screening.  Aimed to substitute 
home and community-based care for 
long-term residential services.  Care 
included all long-term residential, 
nursing, acute and mental health care, 
and home care services. 
IRM: 
Publicly funded capitation payments 
to MCOs who provided and paid for 
services.  State made capitation 
payments to managed care 
organisations for provision of LT care 
related services to individuals in a 
defined geographical area. 
Retrospective analysis of observational 
data to estimate expected nursing home 
use and costs for older people with 
physical impairments, based on a national 
dataset of nursing home and community 
residents.  
 
Risk factors for nursing home residency 
derived using logistic regression from 
national data. The likelihood of nursing 
home residency for each individual served 
by the home and community-based 
services program was then predicted, and 
this was combined with predicted length of 
NH stay using a similar methodology.[126] 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not reported 
Service use & costs 
Estimated to be cost saving, based on simulation 
model comparing observed and expected nursing 




Risk adjustment may have been inadequate as NH 
admission reflects factors other than client 
characteristics (e.g. clinical decisions, local policy and 
service provision, income, family preferences).  Most 
of the risk factors for nursing home admission were 
negatively associated with length of stay – i.e. 
positively associated with a higher risk of death.  
However, time to death is difficult to model and 
predict, making the findings uncertain.  







1. Older people (Senior Care 
Options);  
2. younger people with physical 
and mental disabilities (Disability 
Care Program); 
3. Medicaid-eligible adults and 
children with multiple chronic 
illnesses (e.g. mental health and 
substance abuse problems) 
(Complex Care Needs). 
Integration model: 
Compared with FFS using routine data for 
‘comparable’ populations. No explicit risk 
adjustment. 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not reported. Achieved high scores for some HEDIS 
(national) process measures of care quality.  
Service use & costs 
Group 1: lower bed days, lower rate of nursing home 
placement, lower total medical spending growth.  
Barriers 
Regulatory barriers to combining funds from multiple 
payers.  The 2010 Affordable Care Act may help 
integrate Medicare and Medicaid payments [81]. 
High costs of meeting state insurance regulation.  
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Established 2003 by Robert Master, 
who had also founded CMA, aiming to 
reach a broader population.  Based in 
primary care practices, 
multidisciplinary teams (nurse 
practitioner-led) conduct needs 
assessments, design individualised 
care plans, and co-ordinate primary, 
mental health and social care in the 
community.  Some care is provided by 
the teams, other services by affiliated 
provider groups. Computerised 
routine data used to benchmark 
performance across sites.  
Affiliated to CMA. 
IRM: 
Capitated payments from Medicare 
and Medicaid (client group 1); risk-
adjusted capitated contracts with 
Medicaid and Neighborhood Health 
Plan (2); financing for client group 3 
not stated.  
 
See also Community Medical Alliance 
 








Severely disabled or seriously ill 
children or adults eligible for Medicaid 
(e.g. people with AIDS).  
Integration model: 
Established in 1992, incorporated as a 
specialist part of a large HMO in 1996. 
Primary care team (physician and 
nurses) coordinated all aspects of 
care, including mental health services, 
long-term care, social and support 
services (e.g. equipment), and medical 
care.   
IRM: 
Risk-adjusted Medicaid premium 
(based on Medicaid FFS average for 
client condition).  
Individual physicians and nurses bore 
no direct financial responsibility – e.g. 
no penalty for hospital referral. 
Specialists paid fee-for-service, 
Uncontrolled before and after study [127] Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not reported.  High level of client satisfaction 
maintained in both client groups.   
Service use & costs 
Relative to fee-for-service, total per capita spend and 
acute hospital spend fell for members with severe 
physical disabilities [127].  In the AIDS programme, 
the cost experience was “more erratic” (p. SP96, 
[127])  but shifts in resources from hospital to 
primary care, medical equipment, AIDS-related 
pharmacy, personal care, and community-based 
long-term care services were observed [32]. 
Barriers 
Diffusion (roll out) of this demonstration project has 
proved challenging. Reasons include: inflexibilities in 
Medicaid which prohibit pooled funding (almost all 
middle income individuals are ineligible); and 
accountability requirements / regulation limit clinical 
freedom to shift resources towards community 
based care [32].  
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primary care physicians paid by 
monthly capitation.  
 
See also Commonwealth Care Alliance 
USA Minnesota Senior Health 
Options (MSHO) 






People aged 65+ who are eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid. Eligibility not 
defined by frailty level.  
Minnesota Disability Health Options 
program implemented in November 
2002 (no evaluation found). 
Integration model: 
Introduced 1997. Health insurance 
plans subcontract providers and 
programmes, which can integrate 
delivery and financing of a full range 
of medical and chronic long-term care 
services. Flexible provision, but all 
enrolees have coordinated care. 
Evercare is the main subcontractor for 
MSHO nursing home enrolees.  
IRM: 
Pooled Medicare and Medicaid funds, 
provider incentives to encourage 
home and community based care [20].  
Use of ‘partial’ capitation: the 
capitation payment for Medicaid long-
term care services includes 6 months 
of nursing facility liability, after which 
the managed care organisation 
receives a supplemental payment 
[131]. 
Kane 2003 [9] undertook longitudinal 
analyses of outcomes in MSHO enrolees in 
two settings: 
1. Community: data collected by two 
surveys, using proxy responses where 
necessary. Outcomes dichotomised, 
and logit regressions run adjusting for 
demographics and cognitive status. 
Study period: 1998/9 and 2000/1 
2. Nursing home (NH): routine data 
collected for reimbursement to 
analyse change in ADL (functional 
status) using OLS regressions, 
adjusting for demographics and 
morbidity.  
Community enrolees (N=293) compared 
with two matched control groups 
1. In area controls (N=341): people in 
the same county who were eligible 
but did not enrol in MSHO 
2. Out of area controls (N=276): people 
in other metropolitan areas where 
MSHO was not available 
Nursing home resident data for 1995 to 
1998 were analysed by enrolee status 
(2392 in MSHO / 9050 not).  
 
Kane 2004 [129] reports quasi-
experimental utilisation study, also using 
two control groups; two analyses: 
1. matched cohort 
2. rolling cross-sectional analysis 
Regression models used to adjust for case-
mix differences.  
Study period: 1997-2000. 
Cohort study: MHSO (N=2709); control-in 
(N=8790); control-out (N=2486). 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Community group: no substantive differences in 
outcomes (health status, disability, unmet functional 
needs, and satisfaction).  Carer burden was 
significantly lower in the MSHO group, but only 
when data from the two surveys were pooled (i.e. 
cross sectional analysis) [9].  
NH group: no significant differences in functional 
decline in the fully adjusted model [9]. 
Service use & costs 
In both analyses by Kane 2004 [129], the MSHO 
enrolees, whether community or nursing home 
based, had significantly fewer physician contacts; the 
NH group also had significantly fewer admissions and 
emergency services (preventable and overall).  Other 
findings varied by type of control group and type of 
analysis.  
Community cohort: no significant differences in 
hospital admission rates or in hospital days. MSHO 
enrolees had significantly fewer preventable hospital 
admissions and significantly fewer preventable 
emergency services than the control-in group.  
NH cohort: MSHO enrolees had significantly fewer 
hospital admissions than either control group with or 
without adjustment at 12 and 18 months. MSHO 
enrolees had significantly fewer hospital days and 
preventable hospitalizations than the control-in 
group. MSHO enrolees had significantly fewer 
emergency room visits and preventable emergency 




This evidence is interesting because it evaluates the 
effect of integrated funding as the major change (+ 
some care co-ordination) on similar patients. The 
study “failed to show any remarkable benefits from 
the merging of payments from Medicare and 
Medicaid… little evidence that shifting this care to a 
consolidated funding approach managed through a 
series of health insurance plans with the addition of 
care coordination has produced improvements in 




Authors did not adjust for clustering of patients 
within organisations, so the precision of the findings 
may be overstated.  
USA  On Lok  
[7, 16, 30] 






Frail older people on low incomes who 
were eligible for nursing home care 
[7]. 
Integration model: 
Based in Chinatown, San Francisco; 
expansion of adult day care in 
response to shortage of skilled nursing 
beds for local community [16]. 
Consolidated case management by 
multi-disciplinary in-house team (staff 
model) where possible, for provision 
of health and social care services.   
Prototype for PACE.  
IRM: 
Capitated Medicare and Medicaid 
payments to cover all acute and long 
term care, including primary care.  
Descriptive review of quasi-experimental 
study that used matched controls [7]. 
N=140 
2 year study 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Significant differences regarding functional 
independence, favouring On Lok.   
Service use & costs 
Relative to controls, the intervention group received 
more outpatient services for medical, therapeutic 
and supportive needs and significantly less use of 
skilled nursing facility. The control group received 
more personal care and homemaker input. Lower 
acute hospital use by On Lok clients, but difference 
was not significant. On Lok per person costs were 
21% lower than the control group, reflecting lower 
costs of inpatient care (hospital and skilled nursing). 
Barriers 
Some clients find the group setting of adult day care 
unattractive [16]; see also PACE. 
USA  Program of All-Inclusive Care 
for the elderly (PACE)  







People aged 55+ on low incomes, 
living in the community and eligible 
for nursing home care according to 
state certification criteria, i.e. 
significant functional problems and 
several chronic conditions. About half 
of PACE clients have dementia and 
95% are dual eligibles for Medicare 
and Medicaid [16]. 
However, only 17,000 (of 9m) dual 
eligibles are covered by PACE [33](p 
571).  
Integration model: 
The model has operated for over 20 
years. PACE aims to enable individuals 
to live in the community as long as 
possible, through comprehensive 
medical, psychosocial and long term 
care services.  Clients must switch to 
the PACE care team, including the 
primary care doctor, hospital, 
pharmacy and nursing home.  The 
core of the package is the adult day 
Quasi-experimental studies.  
 
Study 1: In Chatterji 1998 [3], PACE 
refusers were the controls, with 
multivariate analysis used to adjust for 
known differences in baseline 
characteristics.  
Sample varied by follow up period. Largest 
N: 
881 / 374 
 
Study 2: Quasi-experimental cohort study 
compared PACE with the more flexible 
Wisconsin Partnership Program (WPP), in 
which clients could use their own family 
physician and were not obliged to attend 
adult day care [134].  Both WPP and PACE 
integrated funding from existing Medicaid 
and Medicare programs into one program 
through federal demonstration waivers 
[134]. Therefore, this study investigates 
differences in the integrated care approach 
(less restricted day care and physician 
choice options), not differences in 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Study 1: Few significant differences in quality of life, 
health status or satisfaction with care ([3]; p 38) 
although PACE clients were more likely to attend a 
weekly social event. Functional status (on a small 
subset of domains assessed) was better in the 
intervention group [3];( p 40-1).  Lower mortality 
rates and longer stays in the community reported 




Service use & costs 
Study 1: Programmes expensive to implement and 
very capital intensive. PACE enrolees had lower 
admission rates and shorter stays in both hospitals 
and nursing homes than comparison group members 
(PACE refusers). Use of primary care was significantly 
higher in the intervention group. The effects 
diminished over time and most differences were not 
statistically significant at 24 months [3] (p 29-30).  
Study 2: Compared with WPP, PACE enrolees were 
significantly less likely to be admitted to hospital and 
less likely to visit the emergency department 
60  CHE Research Paper 97 
 
care centre, co-located with a primary 
care clinic, which clients attend 
several times a week for needs 
assessment and carer respite. As a 
results, start-up capital for a PACE 
programme is around $1-$1.5m [131]. 
Extension of On Lok.  There were 19 
further demonstration sites and the 
integrated care model became known 
as PACE.  Designated as a permanent 
Medicare program in 1997 [16]. 
IRM: 




capitation payments from CMS, 
financed through pooling of Medicare 
and Medicaid revenues, to cover all 
acute and long term care for eligible 
population. The Medicaid component 
can be renegotiated annually to reflect 
within-year changes in health status 
[33].  PACE programs authorised to 
use prepaid, capitated funds flexibly 
[58] for home and hospital services.  
Programs contract with outside 
entities for hospital and medical 
specialty services, but the primary 
care physician retains control over 
utilisation [16].   
See also: On Lok, and Wisconsin 
Partnership Program (WPP) 
financing. 
Methodology very similar to that used by 
Kane 2006 [12] (see WPP).  




Helped to break down funding silos within US 
system, but the nursing home market remains 
dominated by for-profit providers.  Although open to 
for-profit providers, none has entered the market: 
may be due to lack of start-up capital – (need 
sponsor) and/or high risk client group [16]. 
PACE may involve ‘cream skimming’, excluding those 
with psychiatric or substance abuse problems.  Adult 
day care unappealing to some potential clients [16]. 
Other 
Non-equivalent group design subject to the usual 
caveats (imperfect risk-adjustment, unknown 
confounders etc). In particular, the authors could not 
adjust for frailty or functioning, so findings may 
reflect selection bias. 
USA  Social Health Maintenance 
Organisations  S/HMO   
First and second generation 
S/HMOs (I & II) 





S/HMO I: Persons 65+ year olds, 
including those not eligible for 
Medicaid (i.e. non-frail). Long term 
care restricted to enrolees eligible for 
nursing home care. 
S/HMO II: frail, medically complex 
Medicare beneficiaries with specific 
risk factors [61]. 
Integration model: 
S/HMO I: 4 demonstration sites.  
Medicare HMO coverage of acute 
Retrospective descriptive analysis of 
observational data on utilisation and costs 
for 14,815 individuals enrolled in an 
S/HMO I over an 18 year period (1985 to 
2002) [138]. The SHMO was Kaiser 
Permanente Northwest (Oregon).  
 
Quasi-experimental study of S/HMO I. 
Matched controls obtained from people 
aged 65+ and Medicare fee-for-service 
clients in the areas of 4 sites [7]. 
 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
S/HMO I: relative to FFS group with similar medical 
conditions, lower satisfaction and higher mortality 
rate [61].  
S/HMO II: no consistent evidence that the S/HMO 
improved health or functional status relative to 
HPN’s Medicare risk plan.  No evidence that the 
quality of care was better than in other Medicare 
HMOs or in Medicare FFS systems. 
Service use & costs 
S/HMO I: over an 18 year period, membership 
casemix became increasingly older and more 
                                                          
13
 Reflects individual’s ‘comparative frailty’, relative to general Medicare population, and can also take factors such as end-stage renal disease into account. 
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services supplemented with a limited 
range of long-term care services 
(home and community based) for 
nursing-home certifiable clients (i.e. 
with functional needs). Managed by 
individual care coordinators (social 
worker), low engagement with 
physicians.  
S/HMO II: 1 demonstration site (HPN).  
More generous and better targeted 
care benefits than S/HMO I; 
multidisciplinary team prepares care 
plan that integrates primary and social 
care with specialist geriatric services 
[20, 61].   
Demonstration project ended 2004, 
and S/HMOs then supported through 
disability adjustment to Medicare 
payment. 
IRM: 
S/HMO I: capitation payments to 
integrate acute care and long term 
care; financial risk-sharing between 
demonstration sites and CMS. 
Payments 15-30% higher than 
expected, based on Medicare risk 
contracting [61]. 
S/HMO II: incorporated more 
sophisticated risk-adjusted 
reimbursement, based on health and 
functional status, to discourage cream 
skimming [20].  Capitation 5% above 
level expected for Medicare + Choice 
plans. Sites assumed full financial risk, 
and only 1 of the 6 planned sites went 
live [61]. 
Case study of S/HMO II implementation in 
its first year (1999) [139] and first three 
years [140].  Review of administrative 
reports and charts and interviews with 
clinicians and administrators. 
 
Analysis of 3 years of data on S/HMO II 
(Health Plan of Nevada’s (HPN) ‘senior 
options’) compared with  
(a) HPN Medicare risk plan 
(b) national Medicare beneficiaries 
Administrative data, including data on 
health and functional status collected by 
the health plans [61].  
 
Logistic regression using routine data to 
test the effect of S/HMO vs. FFS on risk of 
conversion of nursing facility stay to long-
term institutional care [63].  
disabled. Utilisation shifted from nursing home 
towards community based care [138]. 
Evidence from controlled evaluations found that 
relative to FFS group, S/HMO I enrolees had higher 
nursing home and home care costs and lower 
hospital costs [7, 61].  
Capitation payments were higher than expected, 
after taking account of casemix. Possibly due to 
gaming behaviour: enrolees classified as nursing 
home certifiable but not highly impaired [61]. May 
alternatively be due to unmet need.  
S/HMO II: No evidence of reduced hospitalisation, 
except in subgroup of high-risk enrolees with history 
of multiple hospital admissions. S/HMO members 
used more physician services and were more likely to 
use skilled nursing facility than members of 
traditional risk plan [61]. 
Compared with FFS, being enrolled in the S/HMO 
increased the likelihood of successful discharge from 
nursing home facilities to the community by 26% 
[63].   
Barriers 
S/HMO I: One of the 4 sites closed because of 
sustained and substantial losses. Lack of co-
ordination between care co-ordinators and 
physicians, and failure to integrate acute and long-
term care. Findings informed S/HMO II [61](p. 12).   
S/HMO II: Six sites received development grants for 
S/HMO II, but just one went live. In addition to 
financial reasons, lack of infrastructure and loss of 
key staff were cited [61]. The case study found that it 
took three years for the S/HMO II to establish its 
programme within clinics and so the evaluation was 
of S/HMO “start up” rather than “steady state” and 
so might not capture longer term effects.  
USA  Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA)  






Veterans, with varying levels of 
service-related disability.  
Integration model: 
VHA is mostly funded from general 
taxation [142].  Fragmented, 
specialist-dominated culture and 
delivering care of variable quality, the 
VHA was re-structured in 1995 to 1999 
and is now the largest integrated 
Jha 2003 [79] compared  
1. the quality of VHA care in 1994 (pre 
restructuring) with that in 2000 (post-
restructuring) (13 indicators) 
2. VHA care with fee-for-service 
Medicare 1997 – 2000 (11 
indicators). Samples were selected to 
reflect comparable populations in 
terms of age and treatment setting.  
Quality indicators were process measures 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not assessed. 
Service use & costs 
After restructuring, the rate of hospital admissions 
fell, bed days were reduced and per-patient 
expenditure fell by 25% [53]. 
Barriers 
“Alignment of finances with desired outcomes is 
essential in any change effort” [53] (p. 328). Kizer 
2009 [53] also cites communication, strategic and 
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provider in the US [80]. Care provided 
by geographical networks: Veterans 
Integrated Service Networks (VISNs), 
each covering ~250,000 veterans. 
VISNs encompass hospitals, primary 
care clinics (facility-based and home-
based), nursing and residential homes 
and counselling centres [53]. 
Responsible for pooling resources, 
coordinating care.  Home-based 
primary care (HBPC) team: primary 
care manager, 24-hour contact for 
patients, prior approval of hospital 
readmissions, and HBPC team 
participation in discharge planning 
[53]. 
IRM: 
VHA allocates resources to each 
network (VISN) using a capitation 
approach known as VERA: veterans’ 
equitable resource allocation. 
Adjusted to reflect network’s historical 
distribution of basic and complex care, 
and input costs.  
(e.g. vaccines and screening tests, use of 
aspirin for AMI etc). Total VHA sample: 
84,500 
Oliver 2007 [80] compared quality 
indicators for the VHA in 2005 with those 
from commercial, 
Medicare and Medicaid sectors (HEDIS 
data) in 2004 using unadjusted routine 
data from 2004/5. 
flexible planning, and appropriate use of 
performance data as keys to success. ‘Virtual’ 
integration can be achieved by the ‘glue’ of an 
information management system, contracts and 
partnership agreements (p. 328).  
Other 
Computerised patient record system. 
Quality of care improved significantly after re-
structuring and relative to Medicare FFS [79].  Oliver 
2007[80] found that the VHA generally 
outperformed Medicare, Medicaid and the 
commercial sector on a range of quality measures 
although it was not clear if these observed 
differences were statistically significant.  
VHA patients tended to receive better overall care, 
chronic care and preventative care than a national 
sample of non-VHA controls. Acute care quality did 
not differ significantly across groups. VHA had 
slightly fewer acute conditions compared to national 
sample.  
USA Wisconsin Partnership Program 
(WPP) 






Frail older people and those with 
physical disabilities, mostly 
community dwelling. Eligible for 
Medicaid, and requiring intermediate 
or skilled nursing care.  
Integration model: 
Managed care programme. Extension 
of PACE, established in late 1990s. 
Provides health and long-term care 
services, clients can continue to use 
their primary care physician and may 
use adult health care. Interdisciplinary 
team (primary care doctor, nurse, 
social worker, client) manages care.  
IRM: 
Integrates Medicare and Medicaid 
funding into a capitation stream 
through waivers.  
Regression and survival analyses of claims 
(billing) data [12].  Included intervention 
clients and two matched control groups, 
one from counties where WPP was 
operational and one from other Wisconsin 
counties.  In both control areas, 
participants were eligible for (or enrolled 
on) home and community based waiver 
services.  Control groups were merged and 
matched with the intervention group for 
demographic, clinical and resource use 
(e.g. use of inpatient care within previous 6 
mths) characteristics. 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
No significant difference in mortality rates.  
Service use & costs 
There were “no major differences” between the 
groups in terms of hospital admission rates, length of 
stay, preventable hospital admission rates, and use 
of emergency services.  
Compared with the control group, there were 
significantly fewer preventable admissions in year 1, 
and a significantly lower rate of hospital days per 
1000 enrolees. WPP clients received significantly 
more face-to-face provider contacts. No significant 
differences in probability of nursing home admission.  
Barriers 
Physicians each manage a small number of WPP 
clients and, although part of the interdisciplinary 
team, do not usually attend team meetings - so lack 
incentives to change their management of these 
patients.  






People with mental health problems 
using primary care and/or social care 
Based on a mapping exercise of joint 
commissioning, in the health authority, 
social services and in GP commissioning 
Effectiveness (health outcomes) 
Not applicable (patient outcomes not assessed) 
Service use & costs 




None described, but scope was health 
and social care for people with mental 
health problems. 
IRM: 
Joint commissioning, defined as 
planning and purchasing. The mapping 
exercise found that ‘true’ joint 
commissioning (i.e. joint planning and 
purchasing) of mental health services 
did not exist at the time of the study 
(1998)  
groups (12/97 – 11/98).  
Interviews with  
 HA commissioners for MH services 
 Social services commissioners for MH 
 GPs in commissioning groups 
Case study: interviews with 28 
commissioners in 3 commissioning groups.  
Selection criteria: 
- One from each urban, rural and 
valleys areas. 
- All had a planning structure for MH 
services 
- Needs assessment, resources 
assessed and prioritisation done 
- purchasing 
- Social services and primary health 
care represented.  
Not assessed 
Barriers 
Recent (1996) reorganisations had impeded progress 
with joint commissioning. Tension was reported 
between policy drives towards (i) a primary care-led 
NHS and (ii) a specialist mental health service (the All 
Wales Strategy targeted resources towards people 
with severe and enduring MH problems), 
compounded by misperceptions and poor 
communication between secondary care teams, 
social services and primary care. The secondary care 
teams perceived GPs as having little expertise in 
mental health and who saw patients with SMI only 
for physical complaints.  GPs refuted these 
assumptions.  There was also uncertainty about 
whether the new flexibilities would enable GMS 
resources to be pooled.  
CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; DiD: difference-in-difference; DVA: Department of Veterans’ Affairs; GP: general practitioner; HA: health authority; HACC: Home and Community Care; HMO: 
Health Maintenance Organization; ICES: integrated community equipment services; IRM: integrated resource mechanism; MBS: Medicare Benefits Schedule; MH: mental health; PBS: Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme; RCT: randomised controlled trial; RDNS: Royal District Nursing Service 
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Appendix 3: Schemes excluded from the review 
 Reason for exclusion  







ACOs (accountable care organisations) [145] x      
Bath and North East Somerset [37, 102]    x No evaluation identified (financial integration introduced after the Audit 
commission evaluation).   
Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust (BEN PCT) [116] x    Aim: to link provider pay to savings delivered. PCT identified 8 areas, 
began with end of life care (clinical only). Process terminated after PCT 
could no longer afford start up costs.  
Blackburn with Darwen Care Trust Plus(CT+) 
[from April 2013: Blackburn with Darwen Clinical Commissioning Group 
(CCG)] [146] [147] 
   x No evaluation identified 
Bolton diabetes network. [25] x      
Brent Integrated Diabetes Care [25, 38] x      
British Columbia system(Canada) [34, 148-150]    x No relevant empirical data. 
Chain DTC, NL [151] x      
Chains of care [152-156] x  x    
Collaborative Care for Depression (CCD) [157] x      
Commissioning of integrated care – PCT examples [116, 146, 158] x      
Community Care North Carolina [145, 159] x    Mostly clinical, but social workers may be involved. 
Evercare (UK) [25, 160] x  x    
Evercare (US) [128, 161] x    Clinical only (for the descriptions / evaluations in the literature) 
Geisinger Health System (Pennsylvania, US) [25, 38, 162] x      
Greater Rochester Independent Practice Association [159] x      
Health Eastleigh Initiative [163]   x  No explicit integration of finances 
Healthy Communities programme [164]    x Descriptive only, little information about joint commissioning 
High intensity case management, US [34]   x    
Hong Kong model [34] x  x    
Isle of Wight mental health services [165] [166]   x  integration of finances unclear 
Jönköping County Council [167] x      
Kaiser Permanente [20, 168, 169] x    KP commissions social and community care to help keep patients out of 
hospital, but focus is clinical care and governance (but see Appendix 2 for 
KP’s adoption of the S/HMO model).  
Knowsley Health and Wellbeing Partnership [37, 83, 102, 116, 146]    x No evaluation identified 
Knowsley has received good ratings from health and social care 
inspectors, and its work acknowledged through a number of national 
awards.   
Knowsley PCT [25, 116, 170, 171] x    Clinical care is main focus (includes social care assessment). 
Liverpool care pathway [25] x  x    
Local Health Care [154, 172] x  x    
Milton Keynes PCT x      
Financial mechanisms for integrating funds for health and social care: an evidence review  65 
 
 
 Reason for exclusion  







NE Lincolnshire PCT (became North East Lincolnshire Care Trust Plus) 
[37, 116] 
   x No evaluation identified 
Nene, Northamptonshire Integrated Care Partnership (ICP pilot) [15]   x  Joint working between health and social care (especially for the ‘end of 
life care’ stream), but the evaluation aggregated findings across pilot 
sites. This means it is not possible to disentangle Nene and certainly not 
just one of the streams. 
New York Visiting Nurse service: VNS CHOICE [173]    x    
Newquay care pathway for dementia [15]   x  No (explicit) integration of finances 
Norfolk integrated care pilot (Norfolk Integrated Care Network) [15]   x  Joint working and joint funding for the scheme but no joint budgets for 
services 
North Lanarkshire Health and Care Partnership [159, 174]   x    
Northumberland Care Trust [83, 175]    x No evaluation found; CT had financial problems and was disbanded.  & 
Little information available about the working of the CT.  
Norwich PCT [176]    x No evaluation identified 
PCMHs (patient-centred medical homes) [145] x      
Principia Partners in Health, Nottingham [15, 25, 110] x      
Puget sound: Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound [20, 168] x      
Redbridge [110] x      
Regionale HuisartsenZorg Heuvelland [159] x      
Rovereto [7] [34, 57]   x  No (explicit) integration of finances 
Smethwick Pathfinder [170] x      
Södertälje mental health and social care consortium [156] [177]   x    
Somerset PCT [116] x      
South East London Cancer Network [25, 38] x      
Texas STAR+PLUS [128]  x   Social care only 
Total Purchasing Pilots [178]   x    
Tower Hamlets PCT [15, 170] x   x Although the overall setup meets our inclusion criteria, the evaluation is 
restricted to an area which is healthcare only 
Trafford [110, 179] x      
Vittorio Veneto [7, 180]    x  No (explicit) integration of finances 
Wales chronic care: health and social care [25] [117, 181]   x  No (explicit) integration of finances 
West Kent PCT [25, 116] x      
Working Unit for Continuous Care (Italy) [25]   x  No (explicit) integration of finances 
66  CHE Research Paper 97 
 
Appendix 4: Methodological issues 
Implementation  
Australian CCTs: Eligibility criteria were relaxed in response to recruitment difficulties, and some 
participants would have had less capacity to benefit than the target population.  Interventions were 
not always tailored to need (one size fits all) [87].    
 
Measurement and reporting issues 
Australian CCTs: Timescale: on average, participants were ‘treated’ for 12 months or less, which may 
not have been sufficient to impact complex illness.  The SF-36 may not be sensitive enough for this 
short time span [87].  
 
Confounding 
Observational studies can seek to adjust for known confounding factors (subject to data availability) 
but are unable to adjust for unknown biases. Administrative data may be unreliable and limited in 
scope, which limits researchers’ scope to risk adjust appropriately, and so reliably assess the 
counterfactual.   An example of this problem was faced by the analysts of ICP pilot data who used 
prognostic scores to match cases with controls for a difference-in-difference analysis:    
 
“Although cases and controls were similar in terms of the variables that we could observe, it is 
nevertheless possible that systematic unobserved differences existed between the groups. We 
have some evidence that this was the case because six-month mortality was greater in cases than 
controls (8.4% vs. 4.8% in case management sites)”[59]. 
 
An example from the US was the evaluation of Program of All-Inclusive Care for the elderly (PACE), 
compared with its more flexible counterpart the Wisconsin Partnership Program [134].  The analysis 
was based on claims data, and risk-adjustment was restricted to characteristics reported in these 
routine data.  Therefore, the finding that PACE clients used less hospital care took no account of 
individuals’ frailty or functioning and so results may have been biased.  A broader problem facing 
many studies is the difficulty of isolating the effect of a particular intervention that is introduced in 
the context of a raft of other interventions and policy initiatives [182].  Not only do the effects of 
these initiatives vary over time, but the effects may also be synergistic.     
 
Selection of the time frame for analysis 
Difference-in-difference analyses need to select the ‘correct’ start points and endpoints to define 
the before and after periods.   In the evaluation of the NW London pilot, the findings of effects on 
hospital admissions were found to vary depending on choice of start date and comparator area [78].    
 
Regression to the mean 
Several studies (e.g. POPP, SHMO II) found that the intervention reduced admissions, but only for a 
small subgroup of people who had high predictive risk scores [60, 61].  These risk scores are 
formulated on the basis of previous hospital use, for instance the use of inpatient and outpatient 
care over the previous three years [51].  However, if these individuals subsequent use of hospital 
care falls, this may be due not to the intervention but to natural variation in repeated data.  
Regression to the mean is a statistical phenomenon associated that happens when repeated 
measurements are made on the same individual.  As values are observed with random error, 
extreme (e.g. high or low) observations are likely to be followed by less extreme ones nearer the 
individual’s true mean [183].  The effects of regression to the mean can be mitigated by robust study 
design, such as randomization.  
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Use of clustering in RCTs 
The two sets of Australian Coordinated Care Trials randomized individual patients to one of four 
arms: three models of integrated care or ‘usual care’.   The models of integrated care all involved 
GPs, but the design of the RCT did not recognize that patients were clustered within GP practices.  
Care given to individuals in the same site will tend to be correlated, which increases the chance of a 
false positive result (type I error).   The other confounding influence is that the GPs who provided 
integrated care were also providing ‘usual’ care to other patients in the trial, which could lead to 
contamination of care for the control group.  These factors may help explain why the trial outcomes 
were generally “disappointing” [87].   
 
Other issues 
NW London: The MDG meetings were intended to be forums for identifying ways to improve 
efficiency in the local health economy by use of innovative out-of-hospital services.  In practice, 
discussions were dominated by GPs and hospital doctors and in the first year only 39% of the 
Innovation Fund (set up to support innovation) was spent [78].   
 
